

26 SEP 1994

Ref: 94-F-1774/L

Mr. Terry L. Slough
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Sierra Vista, AZ 85635

Dear Mr. Slough:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated August 5, 1994, which was received in this Directorate on August 11, 1994.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security, has provided the enclosed documents as responsive to your request.

For your information you are categorized as an "other" requester. Established DoD fees are: clerical search at \$12.00 per hour; professional search at \$25.00 per hour; computer search, varies according to the system used, billed per minute; microfiche at \$0.25 per page; office copy reproduction at \$0.15 per page; and printed publications or reports at \$0.02 per page. Based upon the information provided in your request, we are unable to grant you a fee waiver. Therefore, you are responsible for associated search and duplication cost, less costs for two hours search and the first 100 pages of required duplication, to which you are entitled at no charge.

The total cost of processing your request is \$108.95, of which \$31.45 is reimbursable. Assessable fees consist of 3 hours of search at the professional rate and 143 pages of office copy reproduction (minus 2 hours of search and 100 pages of reproduction which you are entitled free of charge.

Please indicate the reference number above on your check or money order and send your payment for \$31.45, payable to the US Treasurer, within 30 days of the above date to: OATSD(PA), Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review, Room 2C757, 1400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1400.

#647

Please also note the billing date above since payments received later than 30 days after the billing date may incur additional interest charges.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

W. M. McDonald
Director
Freedom of Information
and Security Review

Enclosures:
As stated

Prepared by PREDDIC:pr:9/26/94:DFOI:gr__pk__yl[✓]wh__

**Report
of the
Special Task Force
on the
Defense Foreign Language Institute**

The Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics to form a special task force to carefully evaluate the Army's proposal to close the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, move it to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and contract for foreign language training.

The task force examined: 1) the costs for DLI at its current location; 2) the projected costs of the contracting action; and 3) the required MILCON and moving expenses. To complete this work, the task force gathered data from all affected locations and a task force working group visited each location. As a result, the task force made adjustments to the Army's original costs and savings estimates.

The task force has concluded that, while the Army's original estimates were optimistic, the adjusted costs and savings for this proposal are within the accepted boundaries for return on investment commonly used in the base closure process. For an estimated student load of 2900 a year, the Army proposal would save \$26.1 million a year but would require \$196.4 million in one-time construction and moving costs. This results in a return on investment of six years using the base closure program COBRA model. Return on investment would be reduced to three years with annual savings of \$26.8 million and one-time construction and moving costs of \$150.2 million if an estimated student load of 2450 is used. The Army proposal assumed a 15 percent reduction in funded language training consistent with the continuing defense drawdown. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence believes requirements will remain stable as intelligence positions move to the reserves and special operations areas.

One important element in holding down the one-time construction costs involves free construction of classroom and administrative facilities from the potential contractor in Arizona. As a result, the task force also calculated the costs, savings and return on investment assuming military construction of these classroom and administrative facilities on Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Return on investment grew to 11 years as a result of adding \$68.8 million in construction costs for the 2900 student load option and 7 years as a result of adding \$64 million in construction costs for the 2450 student load option.

The University of Arizona, who submitted the contract concept used for the Army proposal, appears to be capable of performing the foreign language training, assuming they could hire a majority of the DLI language instructors and administrators. However, the special task force has not addressed whether it is good policy to enter into such a contract.

Attachments to the report are as follows:

TAB 1 - Working Group Analysis and Report

**TAB A - Costs and savings assuming
2900 students and contracting-out**

**TAB B - Costs and savings assuming
2450 students and contracting-out**

**TAB C - Costs and savings assuming
2900 and 2450 students and military construction
of classroom facilities**

TAB D - Special Task Force members

TAB E - Data collection questionnaires

TAB F - Working group report

TAB G - Original Army proposal

TAB H - DepSecDef memorandum of April 12, 1993

**TAB 2 - Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications
and Intelligence) Military Value Analysis**

T A B 1

TAB A

Working Group Analysis

2900 Student Load

- o Cost to operate and support Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, in FY 95 and beyond (displayed as annual FY 95 costs)

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| oo DLI Mission Costs | \$53.1 |
| oo DLI Military Pay and Housing Allowances | 16.3 |
| oo BASOPS* | <u>36.7</u> |
| Total | \$106.1 |

- o Cost to operate and support DLI in Sierra Vista, Arizona, once fully in place in FY 99 (displayed as annual costs in FY 95 dollars)

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| oo DLI Mission Costs | \$47.9 |
| oo DLI Military Pay and Housing Allowances | 19.2 |
| oo BASOPS | <u>12.9</u> |
| Total | \$ 80.0 |

- o One-time implementation costs and other selected COBRA outputs

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| oo Construction | \$146.7 |
| oo Moving Costs | 30.8 |
| oo Other | 34.4 |
| oo Cost Avoidance | <u>(15.5)</u> |
| Total | \$ 196.4 |

- o Return on Investment six years: Based on the completion of closure in 1999, the investment (one-time implementation costs less savings during implementation) will be returned in annual savings by 2005 (six years).

* A survey, completed by U.S. Army Force Integration Support Agency (USAFISA), documented a 35 civilian unfunded requirement to provide base operating support to DLI in Monterey, CA. Assuming that this is translated into a budget requirement, the BASOPS budget could increase by as much as \$1.5 million annually (\$44.4 K * 35). If this occurs, the closure of DLI would result in increased annual savings of \$1.5 million.

TAB B

Working Group Analysis

2450 Student Load

- o Cost to operate and support Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, in FY 95 and beyond (displayed as annual FY 95 costs)

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| oo DLI Mission Costs | \$46.1 |
| oo DLI Military Pay and Housing Allowances | 12.4 |
| oo BASOPS* | <u>36.7</u> |
| Total | \$ 95.2 |

- o Cost to operate and support DLI in Sierra Vista, Arizona, once fully in place in FY 99 (displayed as annual costs in FY 95 dollars)

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| oo DLI Mission Costs | \$41.7 |
| oo DLI Military Pay and Housing Allowances | 14.5 |
| oo BASOPS | <u>12.2</u> |
| Total | \$ 68.4 |

- o One-time implementation costs and other selected COBRA outputs

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| oo Construction | \$109.8 |
| oo Moving Costs | 26.9 |
| oo Other | 29.0 |
| oo Cost Avoidance | <u>(15.5)</u> |
| Total | \$150.2 |

- o Return on Investment three years: Based on the completion of closure in 1999, the investment (one-time implementation costs less savings during implementation) will be returned in annual savings by 2002 (three years).

* A survey, completed by U.S. Army Force Integration Support Agency (USAFISA), documented a 35 civilian unfunded requirement to provide base operating support to DLI in Monterey, CA. Assuming that this is translated into a budget requirement, the BASOPS budget could increase by as much as \$1.5 million annually (\$44.4 K * 35). If this occurs, the closure of DLI would result in increased annual savings of \$1.5 million.

TAB C

**Costs and Savings Assuming 2900 and 2450 Students
and Military Construction of Classroom Facilities**

2900 Student Load

- o Cost to operate and support Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, in FY 95 and beyond (displayed as annual FY 95 costs)

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| oo DLI Mission Costs | \$53.1 |
| oo DLI Military Pay and Housing Allowances | 16.3 |
| oo BASOPS* | <u>36.7</u> |
| Total | \$106.1 |

- o Cost to relocate Defense Language Institute (DLI) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, with no provision to contract-out requirements and construct all facilities required based on 2900 student load option

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| oo DLI Mission Costs | \$53.1 |
| oo DLI Military Pay and Housing Allowances | 19.2 |
| oo BASOPS | <u>9.9</u> |
| Total | \$ 82.2 |

- o One-time implementation costs and other selected COBRA outputs

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|----------------------------|-------------------|
| oo Construction (+\$68.8M) | \$215.5 |
| oo Moving Costs | 30.8 |
| oo Other | 41.3 |
| oo Cost Avoidance | <u>(15.5)</u> |
| Total | \$272.1 |

- o Return on Investment eleven years: Based on the completion of closure in 1999, the investment (one-time implementation costs less savings during implementation) will be returned in annual savings by 2010 (eleven years).

* A survey, completed by U.S. Army Force Integration Support Agency (USAFISA), documented a 35 civilian unfunded requirement to provide base operating support to DLI in Monterey, CA. Assuming that this is translated into a budget requirement, the BASOPS budget could increase by as much as \$1.5 million annually (\$44.4 K * 35). If this occurs, the closure of DLI would result in increased annual savings of \$1.5 million.

2450 Student Load

- o Cost to operate and support Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, in FY 95 and beyond (displayed as annual FY 95 costs)

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| oo DLI Mission Costs | \$46.1 |
| oo DLI Military Pay and Housing Allowances | 12.4 |
| oo BASOPS* | <u>36.7</u> |
| Total | \$ 95.2 |

- o Cost to relocate Defense Language Institute (DLI) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, with no provision to contract-out requirements and construct all facilities required based on 2450 student load option

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| oo DLI Mission Costs | \$46.1 |
| oo DLI Military Pay and Housing Allowances | 14.5 |
| oo BASOPS | <u>9.2</u> |
| Total | \$ 69.8 |

- o One-time implementation costs and other selected COBRA outputs

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|--------------------------|-------------------|
| oo Construction (+\$64M) | \$173.8 |
| oo Moving Costs | 26.9 |
| oo Other | 35.4 |
| oo Cost Avoidance | <u>(15.5)</u> |
| Total | \$220.6 |

- o Return on Investment seven years: based on the completion of closure in 1999, the investment (one-time implementation costs less savings during implementation) will be returned in annual savings by 2006 (seven years).

* A survey, completed by U.S. Army Force Integration Support Agency (USAFISA), documented a 35 civilian unfunded requirement to provide base operating support to DLI in Monterey, CA. Assuming that this is translated into a budget requirement, the BASOPS budget could increase by as much as \$1.5 million annually (\$44.4 K * 35). If this occurs, the closure of DLI would result in increased annual savings of \$1.5 million.

TAB D

ASD(P&L) Special Task Force
on
Defense Foreign Language Institute

- Mr. David J. Berteau, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense (Production and Logistics), Office of Secretary of Defense.
- Mr. Craig Wilson, Director for Intelligence Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence).
- MG James Lyle, Director, Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Office of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
- BG Joe Ballard, Director, Total Army Basing Study, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
- COL Jerry N. Armstrong, Director of Institutional Training, Readiness and Training Directorate, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel.
- Mr. Joseph Smith, Budget Analyst, Construction Directorate, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
- Col Rick Owen, Senior Marine Corps Member, Base Structure Analysis Team, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
- Mr. Bryan Jack, Operations Research Analyst, Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- Mr. Patrick M. Conway, Assistant Deputy for Manpower and Programs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Force Management and Personnel.
- Mr. Doug Frazier, Budget Analyst, Assistant for Manpower, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict.
- Staff Director: Mr. Douglas B. Hansen, Director, Base Closure and Utilization, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics).

TAB E

DATA COLLECTION QUESTIONS

Department of the Army

Moving Language Training

- Movement without interruption of training will require classes to be conducted simultaneously at the Presidio as well as at the new location. What costs are associated with this duplication? Were they considered in the costs of the proposal?

Contracting Out

- Exactly how much of the current DLI mission/support is covered by the University of Arizona \$37 million cost? Beyond resident classroom instruction, the proposal does not make this clear.
- The University of Arizona cost of \$37 million is based on a student load of 2,496. Why? How does this change with the budgeted student load of 2,900?
- What assurances do we have of the University of Arizona's willingness to absorb the cost of new instructional facilities? Who would maintain the facilities?
- What would the costs be for contract administration/quality control? Are they included in the Army figures?

Facilities

- What facilities (by type and square feet) are required at Fort Huachuca to effectively perform the DLI mission? List by type (administrative, classroom, housing, recreational, etc.), by number, and square footage.
 - Are any facilities available for use without renovation?
 - Are facilities available which would require renovation? At what costs?
 - Are there any new construction requirements? What are the estimated costs?

Fort Ord

- Does the Army have any manpower requirements standard which could be applied to Fort Ord? Were they applied and, therefore, are reflected in the Army costs?

DATA COLLECTION QUESTIONS

Defense Language Institute

Requirements

- Student Loads/Course Lengths/Languages (historical FY 85-93 and POM FY 94-99)
 - By Service and Agency supported
 - Any portion satisfied by contract? -- How much?
 - Any portion satisfied off-site other than by contract? (for example, non-resident instruction)
 - Other training requirements (fitness, legal, weapons, etc.)
- Classrooms - numbers/square feet or student capacity
 - By location (Presidio and Fort Ord)
- Laboratories - numbers/square feet or student capacity
 - By location (Presidio and Fort Ord)
- Miscellaneous administrative/support facilities such as barracks, dining facilities, conference rooms, utilities, etc.
 - By type/location (Presidio and Fort Ord)
- Historical and projected housing usage by students and permanent party (FY 85-93 and POM FY 94-99)
 - By category - permanent vs temporary/barracks vs family housing
 - How does the historical usage trend compare with the stated usage specified in any support agreements that may exist?
 - Historical and projected number of personnel residing off post (i.e. drawing housing allowances)
- Facility shortfalls
 - What facility shortfalls do you currently have at the Presidio and Fort Ord to support or accomplish the current mission at the Presidio? For each shortfall, indicate the programmed cost to construct/renovate facilities based on FY 94-99 POM (broken out by FY).

--- Are there any facilities on the Presidio that are not being used (vacant)? If so, list by type (barracks, classroom, etc.) and square footage.

Costs (DLI Funds) (Historical FY 85-93, at aggregate level only, and POM FY 94-99)

-- Cost of providing language training

--- Manpower - by Officer/Enlisted/Civilian

--- By direct instruction --course development -- school overhead

--- Any existing contracts providing language training support to DLI? If so, for what languages, course lengths, student loads - at what costs - for what duration?

--- Travel for non-resident instruction

-- Administrative support to the school

--- Manpower or dollars for printing/graphics/computers/etc.

--- Washington, DC Office

--- Other (List)

-- Base operating support for the Presidio of Monterey

--- Manpower and dollars by function

--- Any reimbursable support provided by Fort Ord? -- How much? -- What for?

--- What support agreements exist? (non-reimbursable)

--- Any existing BOS contracts and their costs - by function

Other

- Contracting Out

-- If language training was fully contracted out, what would the remaining DLI in-house organization look like and what would that cost?

DATA COLLECTION QUESTIONS

Fort Ord

- Based on the current plan for POM Annex (Fort Ord after the Division leaves)
- Population to be Supported
 - DLI
 - NPGS
 - DMDC/Other DoD Activities
 - Fort Ord itself
 - Fort Hunter-Liggett
 - Other (List)
- Housing (Barracks (square footage and rooms) and Family Housing (square footage and numbers))
 - DLI
 - NPGS
 - DMDC/Other DoD Activities
 - Fort Ord itself
 - Fort Hunter-Liggett
 - Other (List)
- Facilities (other than Family Housing) on Fort Ord (number and square footage by type (i.e. administrative, classroom, recreation))
 - DLI
 - NPGS
 - DMDC/Other DoD Activities
 - Fort Ord itself

- Fort Hunter-Liggett
 - Other (List)
 - Fort Ord Plan for Providing Support
 - In-House (Army funds, including reimbursables, list by FY)
 - Manpower and dollars by function (DEH, etc.) by activity supported (DLI, NPGS, etc.)
 - Construction and renovation costs required to execute plan. List by project; cost and activity supported (DLI, NPGS, all, etc.)
 - Contract
 - Any contracts, either for work on Fort Ord on or at one of the activities supported? List by type; cost and activity supported.
 - Support Agreements
 - What support agreements exist? List.
-

DATA COLLECTION QUESTIONS

Fort Huachuca

- Based on the current plan for support of Headquarters, Information Systems Command and the Army's Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca.
 - Would any facilities be available to support DLI's mission that would not require renovation? List by type (administrative, classroom, housing, recreational, etc.) and square footage.
 - Would any facilities be available to support DLI's mission if they were renovated? List by type (administrative, classroom, housing, recreational, etc.) and square footage with an estimate of renovation costs.
 - Are there any existing leases which would be available to support DLI's mission? List by type (administrative, classroom, housing, recreational, etc.) and square footage with current cost.
 - Would any part of Fort Huachuca's BOS be charged to DLI? If so, how much and on what arrangement (reimursable, Army funding in BOS, etc)?

DATA COLLECTION QUESTIONS

Defense Manpower Data Center and Other DoD Agencies

Support Requirements from Army

- Base Operating Support
 - Any reimbursable support provided by Fort Ord? -- How much? -- What for? If possible, historical FY 85-93 and POM FY 94-99.
 - Any non-reimbursable support agreements? -- What for?
- Housing. Historical and projected housing usage (FY 85-93 and POM FY 94-99).
 - By category - permanent vs temporary/barracks vs family housing
 - How does the historical usage trend compare with the stated usage specified in any support agreements that may exist?
 - Historical and projected number of personnel residing off-post (i.e. drawing housing allowances)
- Any leases executed by the Army? List by type (office, etc.) with square footage and cost.
- Any other Army support? List by type.

DATA COLLECTION QUESTIONS

Naval Postgraduate School

Support Requirements from Army

- Base Operating Support
 - Any reimbursable support provided by Fort Ord? -- How much? -- What for? If possible, historical FY 85-93 and POM FY 94-99.
 - Any non-reimbursable support agreements? -- What for?
- Housing. Historical and projected housing usage by students and permanent party (FY 85-93 and POM FY 94-99).
 - By category - permanent vs temporary/barracks vs family housing
 - How does the historical usage trend compare with the stated usage specified in any support agreements that may exist?
 - Historical and projected number of personnel residing off-post (i.e. drawing housing allowances)
- Any leases executed by the Army? List by type (office, etc.) with square footage and cost.
- Any other Army support? List by type.

TAB F

**ASD(P&L) Special Task Force
on
Defense Foreign Language Institute**

Working Group Report

Working Group Members

- o Mr. Doug Hansen, Director for Base Closures and Utilization, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics)
- o Mr. Joe Smith, Military Construction Directorate, Office of the DoD Comptroller
- o Mr. George Ostrom, Assistant Director for Intelligence, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
- o Mr. John Nerger, Deputy Director, Total Army Basing Study, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army
- o Mr. Pat Conway, Assistant Deputy for Manpower and Programs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Force Management and Personnel

Working Group Data Gathering

o Working Group Visited

- oo Defense Language Institute (DLI), Monterey, California**
- oo Naval Post Graduate School (NPG), Monterey, California**
- oo Other Defense Agencies, Monterey, California**
- oo Fort Ord, Monterey, California**
- oo University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona**
- oo Fort Huachua, Sierra Vista, Arizona**

o Data Collected

- oo DLI operations and output**
- oo Cost to operate DLI**
- oo DLI support requirements from Fort Ord**
- oo Naval Post Graduate School support requirements from Fort Ord**
- oo Other Defense Agency support requirements from Fort Ord**
- oo Fort Ord plan for supporting DLI, NPG and other Defense Agencies**
- oo Costs to operate Fort Ord annex and portion attributable to DLI only**
- oo University of Arizona planned operations and output**
- oo University of Arizona projected costs**
- oo Fort Huachuca construction requirements to support DLI**

Working Group Observations

- o Defense Language Institute (DLI) produces a quality product and has dramatically improved the proficiency of its graduates over the past decade.
- o DLI has a capacity to train an average of 4,000 students a year (DLI trained 3077 in FY 92)
- o Students are predominately E-4's and many married students must live on the local economy (BAQ/VHA averages over \$700 per month)
- o If DLI stays in Monterey, California, the housing shortage will be eliminated by using Fort Ord houses.
- o The University of Arizona is capable of performing the DLI functions and is committed to doing so (assuming U of A can hire a majority of the DLI instructors). The University plan envisions moving DLI intact to Sierra Vista, Arizona.
- o DLI civilian employees could retain their federal employee status (as the University is a land grant college) plus they would get University employee benefits, like free tuition for themselves and their families.
- o The cost of living is dramatically lower in Sierra Vista, Arizona.
- o There are military value benefits to co-locating DLI with the Army's Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, (assuming no degradation in DLI output).

Working Group Analysis

Issues

Student Load Requirement: Current training load is capped at 2900, the requirement is higher. The Army used a 2450 student load. The Army assumed a 15 percent reduction in funded training consistent with a continuing defense drawdown.

- o Working Group Assumption: Calculated costs and savings at both 2900 and 2450 student loads.

University of Arizona Costs:

- o **Direct Language Instruction:** The University said they could reduce direct instruction costs by 10 percent to 25 percent. Through use of technology the University has developed, they would plan on producing the same proficiency graduate in fewer weeks.
 - oo Working Group Assumption: While this is possible in the long run it does not appear to be in the short term. The working group took the conservative approach -- no savings here.
- o **Support to Direct Instruction:** The University said they could reduce support costs by 10 percent to 25 percent. DLI (at 2900 students) would, for support purposes, be a small (and therefore marginal) increment to the University's support structure, which now supports 35,000 students
 - oo Working Group Assumption: Assume 25 percent savings.
- o **Military Instructors:** The Army assumed that military instructors would not be required if the University was responsible for classroom instruction.
 - oo Working Group Assumption: Military instructors provide valuable mentorship to students and were therefore retained.

Working Group Analysis

2900 Student Load

- o Cost to operate and support Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, in FY 95 and beyond (displayed as annual FY 95 costs)

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| oo DLI Mission Costs | \$53.1 |
| oo DLI Military Pay and Housing Allowances | 16.3 |
| oo BASOPS* | <u>36.7</u> |
| Total | \$106.1 |

- o Cost to operate and support DLI in Sierra Vista, Arizona, once fully in place in FY 99 (displayed as annual costs in FY 95 dollars)

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| oo DLI Mission Costs | \$47.9 |
| oo DLI Military Pay and Housing Allowances | 19.2 |
| oo BASOPS | <u>12.9</u> |
| Total | \$ 80.0 |

- o One-time implementation costs and other selected COBRA outputs

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| oo Construction | \$146.7 |
| oo Moving Costs | 30.8 |
| oo Other | 34.4 |
| oo Cost Avoidance | <u>(15.5)</u> |
| Total | \$ 196.4 |

- o Return on Investment six years: Based on the completion of closure in 1999, the investment (one-time implementation costs less savings during implementation) will be returned in annual savings by 2005 (six years).

* A survey, completed by U.S. Army Force Integration Support Agency (USAFISA), documented a 35 civilian unfunded requirement to provide base operating support to DLI in Monterey, CA. Assuming that this is translated into a budget requirement, the BASOPS budget could increase by as much as \$1.5 million annually (\$44.4 K * 35). If this occurs, the closure of DLI would result in increased annual savings of \$1.5 million.

Working Group Analysis

2450 Student Load

- o Cost to operate and support Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, in FY 95 and beyond (displayed as annual FY 95 costs)

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| oo DLI Mission Costs | \$46.1 |
| oo DLI Military Pay and Housing Allowances | 12.4 |
| oo BASOPS* | <u>36.7</u> |
| Total | \$ 95.2 |

- o Cost to operate and support DLI in Sierra Vista, Arizona, once fully in place in FY 99 (displayed as annual costs in FY 95 dollars)

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| oo DLI Mission Costs | \$41.7 |
| oo DLI Military Pay and Housing Allowances | 14.5 |
| oo BASOPS | <u>12.2</u> |
| Total | \$ 68.4 |

- o One-time implementation costs and other selected COBRA outputs

| | <u>\$ Million</u> |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| oo Construction | \$109.8 |
| oo Moving Costs | 26.9 |
| oo Other | 29.0 |
| oo Cost Avoidance | <u>(15.5)</u> |
| Total | \$150.2 |

- o Return on Investment three years: Based on the completion of closure in 1999, the investment (one-time implementation costs less savings during implementation) will be returned in annual savings by 2002 (three years).

* A survey, completed by U.S. Army Force Integration Support Agency (USAFISA), documented a 35 civilian unfunded requirement to provide base operating support to DLI in Monterey, CA. Assuming that this is translated into a budget requirement, the BASOPS budget could increase by as much as \$1.5 million annually (\$44.4 K * 35). If this occurs, the closure of DLI would result in increased annual savings of \$1.5 million.

Working Group Conclusions

- o Used conservative numbers (for example PCSing the majority of the DLI staff)**
- o University of Arizona has considerably refined their concept plan**
- o University of Arizona costs were understated**
- o BASOPS costs at Monterey were overstated and therefore Army annual savings were overstated**
- o Construction estimates at Fort Huachuca were accurate**
- o Bottom Line: Costs and savings by themselves are within acceptable return on investment standards for BRAC**
 - oo Six year return on investment for 2900 student load**
 - oo Three year return on investment for 2450 student load**

Background

University of Arizona Cost Calculations

- o FY 95 Defense Language Institute (DLI) Mission Cost (excluding military) - \$53.1 (Source DLI)

- o FY 92 resident training costs split between instruction and support (teaching and other in University of Arizona terms) (Source DLI)
 - o Instruction: \$210 per student week - 62%
 - o Support : \$129 per student week - 38%

\$339

- o University of Arizona cost (2900 student load)

| <u>DLI</u> | | <u>U of A</u> |
|-------------|-------------|---------------------------|
| \$32.9 | Instruction | \$32.9 |
| <u>20.2</u> | Support | <u>15.0</u> (25% savings) |
| \$53.1 | | \$47.9 |

- o University of Arizona (2450 student load)

| <u>DLI (2450)</u> | | <u>U of A</u> |
|-------------------|-------------|---------------------------|
| \$28.6 | Instruction | \$28.6 |
| <u>17.5</u> | Support | <u>13.1</u> (25% savings) |
| \$46.1 | | \$41.7 |

TAB G

ARMY RECOMMENDATION

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION

a. Recommendation

- Close the Presidio of Monterey (POM) and the Presidio of Monterey Annex (part of Fort Ord). Relocate the Defense Language Institute (DLI) and contract the foreign language training with a public university which must be able to provide training at or near Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

b. Justification

(1) Military Value

The Defense Language Institute currently has a staff and student population of over 4000 personnel. This institute offers training in over 20 languages (e.g., Russian, Somali, Swahili, Ukrainian). However, it has a high operating overhead in both facilities and staff. A new approach to the operation of the Institute should be considered.

Contracting foreign language training with an existing university level-institution will create significant savings in operational overhead, both in instructors (many of whom may already be on staff at a university), and in administration. The high base operations cost at the Presidio of Monterey would be avoided.

Fort Huachuca is the home of the Army Intelligence School. Military intelligence has the largest requirement for linguists in all services. The foreign language skill is most often used to interact with allies and better understand foreign military capability and intentions. Locating military personnel on Fort Huachuca provides advantages to both the soldier and the Army. First, it enables the Army to care for the needs of the soldiers during their formative training. It ensures "Solderization" which is a critical factor in the development of all military personnel. Finally it will enable the Army to integrate the students into the military intelligence concept during their training.

Army students in the human intelligence field are currently assigned to Fort Huachuca at the end of their foreign language training. Soldiers can attend the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) and continue with advanced language

training or attend the Advanced Non Commissioned Officers Course and then continue with intermediate language training. This would save travel and per diem costs.

An agreement of this kind is not unique. For example, the University of Virginia at Charlottesville is the location of the Judge Advocate General School and the University of Syracuse sponsors the Army Comptroller graduate education program.

The Army, as Executive Agent for the Defense Language Program, will ensure that the same high level of training currently taught at DLI will continue. They will continue to serve as the technical authority and provide qualitative assessment of foreign language training activities. In addition they will also conduct research and evaluation on training development methodologies, instructional methodologies and techniques; computer based training computer assisted instruction; and establish or approve standards or criteria for language training and provide various tests and evaluation procedures.

(2) Return on Investment

The Cost of Base Closure and Realignment Actions (COBRA) model used for ranking alternative closure/realignment actions distributes the costs into six major categories. They are Mission, Personnel, Overhead, Construction, Moving and Other. A short explanation and description of each category follows.

Mission: Direct mission costs are not addressed in this exercise. However, those changes in mission costs result from a closure or realignment action are estimated and are captured in this element.

Personnel: This cost category captures all those costs associated with military and civilian pay and allowances (not including closure generated Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves.) Besides savings of service funded salaries due to decrease in authorizations, differentials in variable housing allowance and/or basic allowance for quarters are also included.

Overhead: Changes in Real Property Maintenance, Base Operations Support, and Family Housing maintenance requirements are the primary components of Overhead. Costs associated with the maintenance and caretaking of an installation are also included as are administrative and support costs generated in the accomplishment of a closure or realignment.

Construction: Military construction (MILCON) cost and avoidances are the main components. MILCON includes estimates for design; supervision, inspection, and overhead; contingency; and site preparation. Site preparation includes the supporting

facilities and infrastructure requirements to support the construction.

Moving: Moving contains all freight and per diem costs incurred in the movement of personnel and material. Included are mileage, reimbursement of income tax assessment, house-hunting, home sale/purchase reimbursement, household goods, packing, storage, loss. The military PCS cost is computed for all military authorizations being moved. This amount is reduced by the amount of routine military PCS costs included in the composite military sale factor.

Other: This category contains a disparate compendium of cost elements. Some of these should be included in the previous categories and will be in future versions of COBRA. The costs elements included here are CHAMPUS, cost for new hires, homeowners assistance, unemployment, information management area (associated with MILCON), environmental mitigation, other one-time costs, procurement cost avoidance, and land sales/purchase. Also addressed are additional personnel costs such as reduction-in-force pay, excess annual leave payments, and priority placement PCS costs.

In addition to the above breakout, the Realignment Summary includes information on the 20-year net present value of the option, the total one time costs, the years to break even, the return on investment years.

The primary costs for realignment of the Presidio of Monterey are costs associated with a university providing the training and military and civilian personnel moves. Savings are generated by eliminating base operations at one installation, while another installation's increase is minimal.

Realignment summary for the recommendation is enclosed.

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04)

Group : TRADOC-POM/HUACHUCA
 Service : ARMY
 Option Package : T4-1X8

Starting Year : 1994
 Break Even Year: 2001 (Year 8)
 ROI Year : 2001 (2 Years)

Option NPV in 2013 (\$K) :-235,574
 Total One-Time Cost (\$K) : 155,499

| | Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars | | | | | | |
|--------------|----------------------------------|----------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | Beyond |
| Misn | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pers | 0 | 0 | 0 | -31,746 | -62,590 | -62,590 | -62,590 |
| Ovhd | 47 | 1,297 | 877 | 18,797 | 13,667 | 13,667 | 13,667 |
| Cons | 9,066 | 100,736 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Movg | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7,878 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Othr | 1,550 | 11,643 | 864 | 23,634 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 10,663 | 113,676 | 1,741 | 18,564 | -48,923 | -48,923 | -48,923 |

| | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | TOTAL |
|--|----------|----------|----------|--------------|----------|----------|--------------|
| <u>FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS</u> | | | | | | | |
| Officers | 0 | -11 | -3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -14 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 92 | 29 | -1 | 0 | 0 | 120 |
| Civilian | 0 | -159 | 6 | -79 | 0 | 0 | -232 |
| <u>POSITIONS ELIMINATED</u> | | | | | | | |
| Officers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilian | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,395 | 0 | 0 | 1,395 |
| <u>PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS</u> | | | | | | | |
| Officers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 73 | 0 | 0 | 73 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 314 | 0 | 0 | 314 |
| Students | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,496 | 0 | 0 | 2,496 |
| TOT MIL | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,883 | 0 | 0 | 2,883 |
| Civilian | 0 | 0 | 0 | 229 | 0 | 0 | 229 |
| TOTAL | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3,112 | 0 | 0 | 3,112 |

Summary:

DLI IS CONTRACTED TO A PUBLIC UNIVERSITY NEAR FT HUACHUCA. POM ANNEX AND FORT ORD ARE CLOSED. CONTRACT COSTS ARE \$37M.

(3) Environmental

Environmental impact was considered at both the gaining and losing installations and was not considered a dominant factor except in compliance and restoration areas. There are no major environmental limitations to closure at the Presidio of Monterey. There are also no major impediments to the relocation to Fort Huachuca.

Summary of potential environmental impact are provided below.

(a) Presidio of Monterey, California.

Threatened or Endangered Species: One listed and one candidate species are located on the installation. Closure is not limited, but disposal may be somewhat limited because the presence of these species precludes unconstrained use of the property by new owners.

Wetlands: No wetlands exist on the installation, therefore does not limit disposal.

Historic or Archeological Sites: Limited information is available about the status of historical and archeological surveys. Building inventories and archeological surveys will be needed to identify historical properties. Disposal may require deed covenants or mitigation, and transfer to another service may require agreement to also transfer historic preservation obligations.

Pollution Control: There is sufficient water, wastewater, and solid waste service available. No limitations exist to transfer to another service.

Hazardous Materials/Wastes: Only minor contamination problems have been identified at this installation. There are no limitations to closure/disposal.

Land Use and Airspace Implications: This installation is primarily a cantonment area. There are no wetlands, impact areas, training areas, airspace restrictions, etc. Natural resource and land management plans are due for completion in FY93. No limitations exist to transfer to another service.

Programmed Environmental Costs/Cost Avoidances: Restoration costs for Fort Ord and all sub-installations is \$60M. Restoration costs for POM are not available.

(b) Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Threatened or Endangered Species: One listed species occurs and many candidate species may occur on post which could result in some mission restrictions. Administrative and cantonment training facilities however, should not be a major problem.

Wetlands: 450 acres of wetlands occur on the installation, but there are no problems with the realignment due to these wetlands.

Historic or Archeological Sites: A Historic Preservation Plan is completed. Archaeological survey and historic building inventory work is underway but not fully completed. New construction might require archaeological survey. Renovation of historic buildings needs to follow guidelines in the Historic Preservation Plan.

Pollution Control/Infrastructure: Water supply and solid waste disposal systems have ample capacities to accommodate the realignment. The wastewater treatment will require upgrade to handle additional population.

Hazardous Materials/Wastes: Realignment of the Polygraph School and the Defense Language Institute should have no impact on the status of on-going or programmed environmental activities. However, if existing facilities are to be used for incoming mission, consideration should be given to potential asbestos, radon, or lead-based paint abatements.

Land Use and Airspace Implications: The installation has 73,000+ acres with 4,900 acres cantonment area, 12,000 acre impact area, 450 acres wetlands, and 20,500+ acres restricted use for other considerations. DERA sites, endangered species, cultural resource sites represent other restrictions. A slight noise encroachment issue exists with the airfield and town of Sierra Vista. Expansion capability exists to accommodate the proposed actions. Constraints to construction may be represented by DERA sites and cultural resource sites.

Programmed Environmental Costs/Cost Avoidances: Programmed environmental costs should not be effected by the receipt of these realignments.

(4) Community Infrastructure

The ability of the existing facilities and the potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel is measured in the assessment of military value. The Places Rated Almanac rating is used to assess the overall quality of life in the surrounding community. The Environmental Carrying Capacity attribute addresses the issue of infrastructure for water, sewer, electrical, and landfill capacity at each installation and includes community infrastructure assets when jointly used. The Army Family Housing attribute assesses the number and quality of family quarters available on post and in the community.

The expansion of infrastructure at gaining installations and communities, including roads, water, sewer, and electrical capacity, is funded when necessary in the military construction estimate.

(5) Socioeconomic

The economic impact on communities was considered by the Army for each professional school being realigned, but was not a deciding factor. There will be increases in unemployment in surrounding communities if any installation is closed or has a population decline. The proposed realignment of the Presidio of Monterey has potential for disposal of facilities and land excess to the Army's needs. Summary of the potential socioeconomic impacts are provided below.

The proposed realignment of the Presidio of Monterey may result in the potential loss of 4.2 percent of jobs in the local community.

5. PERSONNEL IMPACTS

PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

| | FY94 BASELINE | FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES | RIFS | MOVES | CARE- TAKERS | END STATE | NET CHANGE |
|------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------|
| OFFICERS | 72 | 1 | 0 | 73 | 0 | 0 | -73 |
| ENLISTED | 314 | 0 | 0 | 314 | 0 | 0 | -314 |
| STUDENTS | 2496 | 0 | 0 | 2496 | 0 | 0 | -2496 |
| TOTAL MIL | 2882 | 1 | 0 | 2883 | 0 | 0 | -2883 |
| CIVILIANS | 1618 | 6 | 1395 | 229 | 0 | 0 | -1624 |
| TOTAL | 4500 | 7 | 1395 | 3112 | 0 | 0 | -4507 |

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS - FROM PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

| | FT HUACHUCA | FT LEAVENWORTH ¹ | BASE X ² |
|------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| OFFICERS | 54 | 1 | 18 |
| ENLISTED | 203 | 0 | 111 |
| STUDENTS | 2496 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL MIL | 2753 | 1 | 129 |
| CIVILIANS | 197 | 32 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 2950 | 33 | 129 |

1. U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences.
2. Organizations/activities on Presidio of Monterey being relocated to destinations not yet determined. Note: Per DoD guidance, the The Army does not normally specify receiving bases for units or activities of less than 100 U.S. Government personnel. BASE X acts as the surrogate receiving base for units or activities relocating to indeterminate destinations.

TAB H



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



12 APR 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (FORCE MANAGEMENT
AND PERSONNEL)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PRODUCTION AND
LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PROGRAM ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SPECIAL
OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT)
COMPTROLLER

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure, Defense Foreign Language
Institute (DLI)

On March 29, 1993, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission voted to add the DLI to their list of bases being considered for realignment or closure. The DLI was not included as part of the DoD submission. The Army's original proposal to move and to contract the foreign language training mission is a significant change from the current operation and, therefore, one that must be carefully evaluated.

In order to provide the Secretary of Defense and the Commissioners with complete and accurate information to evaluate this decision, it is essential that the proposed alternative be impartially and fully evaluated. By this memorandum, I am tasking the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics) (ASD(P&L)) to lead a special task force composed of functional experts from addressed activities. The task force will examine the following areas: 1) costs for DLI at its current location; 2) projected costs of the contracting action; and 3) required MILCON and moving expenditures.

Please identify a senior representative of your office who will participate in this effort to Mr. Douglas Hansen, Director, Base Closure and Utilization, Office of the ASD(P&L), 614-5356, within two days of the date of this memorandum. I will expect the task force report and recommendations by April 30, 1993.

William J. Perry

cc: DoD Inspector General

81337

T A B 2

Statement on Requirement to Retain Military Operation

The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLI) is the only institution with the teaching programs, faculty, and specialized facilities in place to meet the foreign language training requirements of the DoD, eighty percent of which support intelligence and other critical national security assignments. There is no other faculty, professional staff, or institution currently configured to accomplish this mission. Analogous training activities exist within the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency--as government-operated functions--to meet the foreign language needs of their respectively unique populations and who already have earned college degrees. The DLI was designed for, and has the proven capability to, accomplish the US military's basic language training needs and to support the sustainment and enhancement of military linguists in garrison and when deployed. It would take years to replicate, if it could be replicated at all.

The viability of the realignment action proposed by the Army is wholly dependent on preliminary data provided by one private sector source; to transfer the US military's principal language training to a non-government/non-defense contractor. This, however, is outside the boundaries of current DoD policy: the Department intends that the foreign language training mission--as now practiced by the DLI--will remain a DoD-operated activity. Basing options do not alter this decision.

It must be clearly understood that this proposed closure action does not simply involve closing a base and moving a functioning organization to another location with a like mission and capability. This is not like moving a fighter wing to another base with a flying mission, or an infantry division to another post with a large maneuver area. The Army BRAC proposal involves closing a one-of-a-kind DoD organization, and asking a yet unnamed contractor to totally reconstitute/rebuild the mission capability without any quantitative assessment of the contractor's ability to perform. If the contractor fails, the nation will pay the price in lost defense capability. There is no back up.

The Army, in its original BRAC proposal, compared the contracting out effort to a program it operates with a university for training Army lawyers. The analogy fails because that program starts with individuals who have law degrees; they could still perform as lawyers without the additional training. At the DLI, nineteen year old high school graduates learn a foreign language in from 23 to 63 weeks, to a proficiency standard above any university program--at the baccalaureate level for someone majoring in the language. We then expect the DLI graduates to accomplish their rigorous and demanding missions as military professionals.

We are experiencing sweeping changes throughout the world. Further significant changes will likely occur for the rest of the decade. The implications for the national security posture of the

United States are significant. Intelligence is on the leading edge of national security and remains an essential instrument of national power. The military linguist, trained by the DLI to the standards required by the defense intelligence community, is at the frontend--the "tip of the spear" of the intelligence system. Their ability to completely understand, and often instantly evaluate the criticality of what they hear or read cannot be understated.

In testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) on May 6, 1993, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) stated: "The penalty for failure of DoD intelligence in support of military operations could be catastrophic, and could result in significant and unacceptable military and political consequences."

Realizing that more demands were going to be placed on its military linguists in the future, the Department initiated actions to dramatically improve the foreign language proficiency of the linguist force. In 1987, the General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) (the policy board for the Defense Foreign Language Program) recommended to the executive agent, a significant increase in the language proficiency level of the graduates of the DLI. Further, the GOSC requested the development of final learning objectives for all courses at DLI producing linguists for the intelligence community. Finally, detailed course reviews were initiated to evaluate the most critical courses. As in the past, the DLI drew on internal and external government resources within whom they have had long-standing relations. The institute modified curricula, extended the length of the training day, worked with the Services' assignment systems to extend the time allowed for training, increased properly modulated computer assisted instruction, and strengthened related test developments. As stated above, no other institutes, faculty, or professional staff is configured to operate in this responsive mode--nor with the level of immediate accountability to the user community.

The DLI has an important contingency response role in the Department of Defense. For DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the DLI accelerated its Arabic language program, putting it on a surge schedule, provided video teletraining to units in CONUS. The DLI deployed mobile training teams to Saudi Arabia, and produced customized language materials for deployed forces. For RESTORE HOPE, the DLI developed a Somali phrase card, book, and tape for each deploying marine and soldier, and provided video teletraining to deploying units from Forts Bragg and Drum.

As a government institution, the DLI has the flexibility to meet contingency requirements and to adjust to the sometimes unprogrammed changing needs of the defense intelligence community. The examples cited above, of requirements to raise training standards, or to accelerate production in response to crises, were possible in large measure because the DLI is a government institution. No contracts needed to be renegotiated, no incentive

or other payments were required, and no additional staffing was necessary.

The DLI is a critical element in the national security structure of the United States. Its graduates, military professionals, make an essential contribution to the nation's defense. The capability represented by DLI must be preserved and protected as a DoD institution.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS

TAB C



**REPORT TO THE DEFENSE BASE
CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

**TAB C: TRAINING
INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING/BRANCH SCHOOLS**

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 - Recommendations
 - Return on Investment (COBRA Model)
 - Environmental Impacts
 - Socio-Economic Impacts
- 6. Implementation Plan**

1. DESCRIPTION OF CATEGORY

The installations in the training category have the mission of providing the Army with trained individual soldiers, developing the doctrine that describes how the Army will fight, defining the Army's material requirements, designing the Army's organizations, and developing the Army's leaders. The training mission includes entry level and advanced training for enlisted soldiers and officers, career professional training for the NCO and officer corps, and training for Department of the Army civilians. Because of the diverse missions and training infrastructure associated with the training category, two major groups are associated with training: Initial Entry Training (IET)/Branch School installations and Professional/Other School installations.

The following recommendations are proposed in the category of IET/Branch Schools:

- Realign the Soldier Support Center (U.S. Army Adjutant General School and Finance School) from Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN to Fort Jackson, SC. Retain the Personnel Specialist (75 D/E) Combat Service Support Advance Individual Training load and cadre at Fort Jackson, instead of realigning them to Fort Benjamin Harrison (BRAC I change).

- Retain the Department of Defense Finance and Accounting Services/Indianapolis Center in Building 1, Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN. Carve out part of Fort Benjamin Harrison for use by the Army Reserves. Close the remainder of Fort Benjamin Harrison.

- Divert the realignment of the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) from Fort Sheridan, IL to Fort Benjamin Harrison, a BRAC I action, to Fort Knox, KY. Concurrently, the Army is considering exercising its discretionary authority under Public Law 100-526 to divert the relocation of the Air Base Ground Defense school from Fort Dix, NJ, to Fort Knox, KY, to Fort Benning, GA.

- Realign the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police schools from Fort McClellan, AL to Fort Leonard Wood, MO to form the Maneuver Support Center along with the Engineer school. Realign the Department of Defense Polygraph School from Fort McClellan to Fort Huachuca, AZ. Carve out part of Fort McClellan for use by the Army Reserve. License Pelham Range to the Alabama Army National Guard. Carve out selected facilities on Fort McClellan for use by the Alabama Army National Guard. Place the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF) at Fort McClellan in caretaker status. Close Fort McClellan.

2. RESULTS OF CAPACITY ANALYSIS (SCREENING OF INSTALLATIONS)

The installations listed below were those evaluated within the Training - IET/Branch School category. Installations identified for closure under BRAC I were not evaluated in BRAC 91.

- Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana
- Fort Benning, Georgia
- Fort Bliss, Texas
- Fort Eustis and Fort Story, Virginia
- Fort Gordon, Georgia
- Fort Huachuca, Arizona
- Fort Jackson, South Carolina
- Fort Knox, Kentucky
- Fort Lee, Virginia
- Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
- Fort McClellan, Alabama
- Fort Rucker, Alabama
- Fort Sam Houston, Texas
- Fort Sill, Oklahoma

The results of the relative military value of IET/Branch School installations, in concert with TRADOC's vision to create war fighting centers, determined the preceding recommendations. The following installations in this category were eliminated from closure and realignment actions. A discussion follows.

Many of the training installations are home to a large branch school with its associated training areas and special instructional facilities such as Fort Knox for Armor, Fort Benning for Infantry, Fort Sill for Field Artillery, Fort Bliss for Air Defense Artillery, Fort Gordon for Signal, Fort Leonard Wood for Engineers, and Fort Rucker for Aviation. Their functions are not expected to disappear.

Of the major training bases requiring extensive range and/or maneuver space (i.e. Forts Knox, Benning, Sill, Bliss, Leonard Wood, and Rucker), no other viable alternative installations were

capable of incorporating the breath and density of specific training now conducted without the expenditure of huge sums to replicate these unique capabilities.

In the special case of Fort Rucker, the Aviation school uses 9,000 square miles of airspace up to 10,000 feet in altitude for its training.

Fort Bliss's Air Defense Artillery School would be difficult to relocate. Additionally, Fort Bliss contains major Forces Command tenants (3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade) that would be more disruptive to move.

Fort Jackson is the sole Army Training Center without a branch related school. Fort Jackson trains about one half the Army's basic training soldiers and truly represents the Army's sole remaining capability to accept rapid growth in basic training under emergency conditions without activation of reserve training units. Fort Jackson is second only to Fort Benning in average daily student load. The size and quality of training facilities at Fort Jackson makes relocation prohibitively expensive.

Fort Lee is a multifunctional post with significant tenants. It is the home of the Army Logistic Center, The Quartermaster Center and School, The Army Logistic Management College, headquarters for the Southeast Commissary Region, U.S. Army Troop Support Agency and others in addition to its advanced individual training function.

The Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC I) recommended consolidating all the Army's Cook and Supply Clerk training at Fort Lee. In the time since the Commission's recommendations, force structure changes have greatly altered the installation capacities used by the Commission during its determination of training load distribution. Although recent capital investments have been made in the Advanced Individual Training facilities, relocation of some portion of the training function to another installation may prove to be feasible since they are not high density Military Occupational Specialty producing courses. For example, it may be feasible to consolidate the Cook and Supply Clerk training at Fort Jackson since training load reductions may have created more barracks space at Fort Jackson. Fort Jackson already has the applied instructional facilities for these courses. However, there is an operational disadvantage to relocating these courses away from the Army's Quartermaster School and Center at Fort Lee.

The overall subjective evaluation of Fort Lee shows it in the bottom quarter of the installations in this category. More detailed study will be required to determine the feasibility of

realignments or closures involving Fort Lee. In the short term, out to FY97, Fort Lee is not a candidate for closure.

Fort Sam Houston is the home of the Academy of Health Sciences which trains soldiers in medical skills and provides initial and professional development training for medical and medical Service Corps personnel. The quality of facilities are good and replacement of the facilities would be very costly. Fort Sam Houston is in the middle range of skill production density.

Fort Eustis, including Fort Story as a sub-post, is the home of the Transportation School, the Aviation Logistics School, and the Joint Strategic Deployment Training Center. Although it has a relatively small average daily student load, its facilities are unique. This complex contains unique port facilities which cannot be duplicated at other Army installations. In the overall assessment of all measures of merit, Fort Eustis is at the margin of being in the bottom third. In the short term, considering the absence of adequate port facilities at other Army installations, closure of Fort Eustis is too difficult. In the long term, the feasibility of collocation with another service should be investigated.

In addition to the preceding recommendations, analyses were conducted to collocate the Army Signal School (currently at Fort Gordon) with the Army Intelligence School currently at Fort Huachuca. Three alternatives were analyzed:

1. Closure of Fort Gordon and realignment of the Army Signal school to Fort Huachuca.
2. Closure of Fort Huachuca and realignment of the Army Intelligence school to Fort Gordon.
3. Closure of Fort Gordon and Fort Huachuca and realignment of both schools to Fort Devens, MA.

After study, the preceding alternatives were dismissed. The closure of Fort Gordon would require the relocation of the Army Signal School, the National Science Center for Communications and Electronic and the Army Graduate Medical Education program at Eisenhower Medical Center. These are high density skill producing schools. The infrastructure associated with these functions is extensive and the costs for relocation are prohibitive.

The closure of Fort Huachuca would require the relocation of the Army Intelligence School and Center. This closure also requires relocation of the functions associated with the Electronic Proving Grounds and Joint Interoperability Test Center. Fort Huachuca provides a unique and irreplaceable

condition of an electromagnetic-free environment for test and evaluation of communications and electronic systems training and testing of intelligence and electronic warfare systems. These operating requirements are not available through another service nor elsewhere in the United States.

The results of the relative military value of IET/Branch School installations, in concert with TRADOC's vision to create war fighting centers, determined the preceding recommendations for Forts Benjamin Harrison and McClellan. A discussion follows.

Fort Benjamin Harrison is a multipurpose installation. It is the home of the Army Soldier Support Center (Adjutant General and Finance schools), the Department of Defense Finance and Accounting Services/Indianapolis Center, and proposed home of Headquarters USAREC. It is feasible that, except for Building 1 occupants, Fort Benjamin Harrison could be closed.

Fort Benjamin Harrison is the lowest rated TRADOC installation in the IET/Branch School category. Its operational efficiency is poor as it has a high real property maintenance cost per 1000 square feet and is in a high military construction cost index area.

Fort Benjamin Harrison has a small TRADOC mission. The training functions conducted at Fort Benjamin Harrison are important but require less unique, special, or extensive facilities or acreage than other IET/Branch schools. Another installation could accommodate these functions with relative ease at minimum costs. Expansion external to the property line at Fort Benjamin Harrison is limited and would be expensive. Closure of Fort Benjamin Harrison and realignment of the Soldier Support Center to Fort Jackson supports the TRADOC vision of creating a Soldier Support Warfighting Center.

Building 1, Fort Benjamin Harrison is the second largest administrative building in the DOD inventory. Retaining the Department of Defense Finance and Accounting Services/Indianapolis Center in Building 1, will allow continued operations without engaging in costly leases nor incurring moving costs to locate at another military installation at this time. Carving out part of Fort Benjamin Harrison for use by the Army Reserves will allow this vital organization to remain in the Indianapolis area.

Fort McClellan is the home of the Military Police School, the Chemical School, and the DOD Polygraph School. Fort McClellan has the smallest Army Training Center. Although the Chemical School contains some unique, expensive to replace, and potentially environmentally restrictive facilities, most of the Chemical and Military Police facility requirements may be met with existing facilities at other locations. There are no large

tenants to relocate from Fort McClellan. The Alabama Army National Guard is a major user of the installation facilities and training areas. The overall assessment of Fort McClellan shows it is under-utilized or could accept more initial entry training. Compared to other proponent schools, primarily those training combat skills with large range and maneuver requirements, the functions at Fort McClellan are more feasible to relocate. Overall Fort McClellan falls in the middle band of IET/Branch school installations.

Realigning the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police schools from Fort McClellan, AL to Fort Leonard Wood, MO to form the Maneuver Support Center along with the Engineer school will promote synergy of these branches. Realigning the Department of Defense Polygraph School from Fort McClellan to Fort Huachuca, AZ will provide for collocation with the Intelligence school.

The Fort McClellan area of Alabama has a large Army Reserve and Army National Guard presence. Carving out part of Fort McClellan for use by the Army Reserve and licensing Pelham Range and carving out selected facilities on Fort McClellan for use by the Alabama Army National Guard will allow these vital organizations to remain in the area.

In view of the various proponent schools, it was clear that the vital functions were not being eliminated. However, because the training base must retract, the objective comparison did have to consider a reality. If a proponent school must be moved and the installation closed, then the percentage of total Army positions produced (density of the total Army requirement) and its contribution to combat must be considered. In this light, a low density enlisted or officer skill producing school would rank lower than a higher density skill producing school. And, a combat service support skill production school would be a lower priority than one producing a combat skill. Fort Benjamin Harrison and Fort McClellan appear at the margin in the objective evaluation; therefore, if all other factors remain equal or were non-discriminating, Forts Benjamin Harrison and McClellan should be selected over a school producing high density combat skills.

The analysis indicated that of all the installations considered, Forts Benjamin Harrison and McClellan have the most potential for closure and realignment at the least disruption to the production of the most critical soldier skills and at the least cost. The primary consideration for proposed realignment at Fort Benjamin Harrison is:

- Fort Benjamin Harrison is better used as an administrative post than a training installation. Realignment of TRADOC activities and functions on Fort Benjamin Harrison to other TRADOC installations should be accomplished before closure of other TRADOC posts.

The primary considerations for Fort McClellan are:

- The tenant schools at Fort McClellan, i.e., the Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Defense Polygraph School, are relatively small and do not require extensive maneuver areas not available at other installations. Compared to the number and/or unique missions at other installations, the movement of Fort McClellan's missions would not be as disruptive to the production of critical skills.

- The skills produced represent about 5% of the Total Force and the respective schools can be reestablished on other TRADOC installations which will be operating at less than current capacity in the smaller force.

- Fort McClellan is home to the smallest Army Training Center.

- The CDTF is not essential for chemical detection and decontamination training. While the facility contributes to the readiness and confidence of the soldiers who are trained in the CDTF, these soldiers comprise a very small percentage of the Army. Additionally, live agent training comprises only a few hours of initial entry training and professional development courses.

- The value added by the Maneuver Support Center outweighs the liabilities incurred by closure of Fort McClellan and the CDTF. It supports the concept of training Chemical, Military Police, and Engineer units as a team in the manner in which they would be tactically employed.

- Fort Jackson, the only Army Training Center without a branch school, is too large of a post to be considered for closure at this time. Fort Jackson trains more than twice as many students as Fort McClellan and is the Army's largest recruit training center.


In addition to the recommendations for Fort Benjamin Harrison and Fort McClellan, diversion of two BRAC I actions are recommended. These recommendations are:

- Diverting the realignment of USAREC from Fort Sheridan, IL to Fort Benjamin Harrison, a BRAC I action, to Fort Knox, KY. This action places USAREC on an active duty installation with its own airfield. Currently there is sufficient bachelor quarters at Fort Knox, an area with a low Variable Housing Assistance rate. Additionally, Fort Knox has a hospital and other Army community services which would not be available at Building 1, Fort Benjamin Harrison.

- Concurrent with the diversion of USAREC to Fort Knox, the Army is considering exercising its discretionary authority under Public Law 100-526 to divert the relocation of the Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD) school from Fort Dix, NJ, to Fort Knox, KY, to Fort Benning, GA. The Infantry school at Fort Benning is the proponent for the ABGD program of instruction and doctrine development. Location of the ABGD training on Fort Benning provides an operational benefit for training, instruction, and doctrine development.

The map that follows shows the geographic location of each installation.

MAP OF IET/BRANCH SCHOOL INSTALLATIONS



3. APPLICATION OF FINAL CRITERIA (ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY VALUE)

MILITARY VALUE ANALYSIS DESCRIPTION

The DOD selection criteria state that the Services should give "priority consideration" to military value, as defined by the first four criteria, when selecting an installation for realignment or closure. The Army dedicated the first phase of its study to the determination of the military value of its installations, using the five measures of merit. The crosswalk between measures of merit and final criteria is discussed earlier in this report.

The military value analysis was quantitative in nature and focused on identifying and measuring specific, discrete attributes for each installation. When these attributes are taken as a whole they can reasonably be construed as portraying the military value or utility of an installation, when compared to like installations.

The analytical process resulted in a relative military value array. It depicts the relative military value of installations within a category. The array was produced using a model (Decision-Pad, developed by Apian Software Inc., of Menlo Park, CA) which evaluated specific, measurable attributes across the installations in a category by assigning weights to the attributes based on their importance in measuring the utility of the type of installation. The weighted attribute values were then added and divided by the total weight assigned producing a rating for each post. The ratings are then used to produce the military value array.

The weighting rationale for the attributes used to evaluate this category is provided below. Data included in this array were the best available at the time the analyses were completed.

Following the weighting rationale is the final military value array for this category. The spreadsheet includes the attributes, weights, and actual values for each installation. Scores based upon the attribute values and weights are translated by the model to a relative rank, which is the last line on the array.

WEIGHTING RATIONALE

The application of weighting factors in each subcategory recognizes that all attributes are not of equal importance. The relative values of the weights are determined by use of a modified Delphia technique-- an iterative process by TRADOC senior leadership for overall weighting and subject matter experts (within their area of expertise). These relative weights are then tested in the model and sensitivity analysis conducted. The rationale behind the relative weights assigned to attributes can then be articulated. A final "common sense" test is done to ensure the results are reasonable.

Each attribute is assigned a weight that is uniformly applicable to all installations within that subcategory (IET/branch school installations or professional/other school installations). Weights reflect the general importance of that attribute alone, or in conjunction with another attribute, in describing a composite, overall worth and value of an installation. Sensitivity analyses of weighting were conducted. Only through major change in weights are the relative rankings impacted. Even then, changes are within a couple of places. Radical shifts in relative positions are not found; installations usually remain within the same general band of upper, middle, and lower.

An arbitrary weight of 1,000 points was established. This was further allocated to five measures of merit based on HQDA guidance as follows:

| | |
|------------------------|------------|
| Mission essentially | 250 |
| Mission suitability | 250 |
| Quality of life | 200 |
| Operational efficiency | 150 |
| Expandability | <u>150</u> |
| Total Value | 1000 |

Attributes were developed which best describe the qualities of the measures of merit. These attributes are measurable items that can reasonably be associated with a given measure of merit and by which military utility can be assessed. Attributes for mission essentially and mission suitability were developed by HQ TRADOC with the exception of the unique capability, which was added by HQDA, and are specific to installations and missions of this category. Attributes for the other measures of merit are general to all installations and were provided by HQDA. Weights

were then applied to these attributes, using the modified Delphia technique previously described.

Missions of IET/branch school installations, in general, require acreage to perform soldier training and field exercises. This also supports reserve component training. It is logical then to apply considerable weight to range and acreage attributes. These installations also have a high unmarried enlisted population. Therefore, the weights for the attributes under quality of life were assigned to meet the needs of this population segment.

MILITARY VALUE SPREADSHEET SUMMARY

Military value spreadsheet summaries are shown on the following pages.

**MILITARY VALUE SPREADSHEET SUMMARY
IET/BRANCH SCHOOL INSTALLATIONS**

| | | Fort Ben Harrison, IN | Fort Benning, GA |
|----------------------|-----------|--------------------------|---------------------|
| | WEIGHT | | |
| Multi-function | 41 | 25 | 40 |
| Army Readiness | 34 | 5 | 10 |
| Unique Capability | 62 | N | N |
| Maneuver/Tng Acres | 27 | 1,076 | 109,600 |
| Maneuver Contigiou | 16 | 1,076 | 40,000 |
| Impact Rgn Acres | 28 | 0 | 58,000 |
| Deployment (Trans) | 16 | 4.9 | 8.8 |
| RC/Area Support | 26 | 3.8 | 4.0 |
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY | ----- 250 | 2.2 | 5.1 |
| Gen Instr Fac | 42 | 413,000 | 771,000 |
| Applied Instr Fac | 48 | 12,000 | 142,000 |
| Ranges (BRM) | 29 | 0.0 | 4.8 |
| Maintenance Fac | 25 | 40,000 | 938,000 |
| Admin/Operations | 25 | 1,571,000 | 1,024,000 |
| Info Msn Area Spt | 27 | 975 | 1,460 |
| Medical Facilities | 25 | 1 | 6 |
| Construct Invest | 29 | 36 | 252 |
| MISSION SUITABILITY | ----- 250 | 2.1 | 6.9 |
| Percent Permanent | 23 | 98.2% | 89.1% |
| TRADOC IOE Score | 15 | 6.42 | 7.12 |
| AFH | 28 | 1,799 | 15,887 |
| Officer UPH | 26 | 568 | 2,767 |
| UEPH & Trainee | 38 | 3,041 | 17,357 |
| Community Fac (SF) | 30 | 495,000 | 947,000 |
| Places Rated Alamc | 16 | 30 | 275 |
| Medical Support | 24 | 8 | 21 |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | ----- 200 | 3.4 | 6.2 |
| VHA | 12 | \$62.54 | \$2.25 |
| AFH Costs per DU | 15 | \$5,758 | \$4,114 |
| Avg Civ Salary | 11 | \$29,593 | \$26,453 |
| Wage Rate WG 8/3 | 10 | \$12.59 | \$10.21 |
| BASOPS MER Factor | 11 | 0.193 | 0.107 |
| BASOPS CER Factor | 12 | 4794 | 2503 |
| Utilities Cost Fac | 25 | \$485 | \$442 |
| RPMA Cost Fac | 35 | \$2,531 | \$1,099 |
| MILCON Cost Factor | 19 | 1.07 | 0.79 |
| OPERATION EFFICIENCY | ----- 150 | 2.7 | 7.8 |
| Buildable Acres | 15 | 220 | 4,100 |
| Total Structure SF | 39 | 5,246,259 | 20,643,372 |
| Encroachment | 21 | 1,999 | 54 |
| Environment | 36 | 8.4 | 8.3 |
| Water/Sewage | 39 | 6.6 | 3.4 |
| EXPANDABILITY | ----- 150 | 3.4 | 6.3 |
| SCORE | 1000 | 2.7 | 6.4 |
| RANK | | 14 | 2 |

MILITARY VALUE SPREADSHEET SUMMARY
IET/BRANCH SCHOOL INSTALLATIONS

| | WEIGHT | Fort Bliss, TX | Fort Eustis w/Ft Story, VA |
|----------------------|----------|----------------|----------------------------|
| Multi-function | 41 | 50 | 35 |
| Army Readiness | 34 | 10 | 7 |
| Unique Capability | 62 | Y | Y |
| Maneuver/Tng Acres | 27 | 323,716 | 1,264 |
| Maneuver Contigiou | 16 | 199,915 | 374 |
| Impact Rgn Acres | 28 | 162,012 | 1,547 |
| Deployment (Trans) | 16 | 7.9 | 7.6 |
| RC/Area Support | 26 | 4.2 | 1.3 |
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY | ---- 250 | 8.9 | 4.3 |
| Gen Instr Fac | 42 | 552,000 | 284,000 |
| Applied Instr Fac | 48 | 935,000 | 594,000 |
| Ranges (BRM) | 29 | 8.3 | 0.0 |
| Maintenance Fac | 25 | 872,000 | 464,000 |
| Admin/Operations | 25 | 1,571,000 | 542,000 |
| Info Msn Area Spt | 27 | 1,280 | 1,150 |
| Medical Facilities | 25 | 8 | 1 |
| Construct Invest | 29 | 216 | 82 |
| MISSION SUITABILITY | ---- 250 | 8.2 | 3.0 |
| Percent Permanent | 23 | 91.6% | 92.0% |
| TRADOC IOE Score | 15 | 8.62 | 5.77 |
| AFH | 28 | 9,210 | 5,735 |
| Officer UPH | 26 | 1,001 | 703 |
| UEPH & Trainee | 38 | 12,073 | 7,127 |
| Community Fac (SF) | 30 | 1,083,000 | 432,000 |
| Places Rated Alamc | 16 | 222 | 33 |
| Medical Support | 24 | 4 | 14 |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | ---- 200 | 5.2 | 3.7 |
| VHA | 12 | \$0.00 | \$136.48 |
| AFH Costs per DU | 15 | \$3,624 | \$5,559 |
| Avg Civ Salary | 11 | \$27,047 | \$30,288 |
| Wage Rate WG 8/3 | 10 | \$10.82 | \$10.54 |
| BASOPS MER Factor | 11 | 0.105 | 0.114 |
| BASOPS CER Factor | 12 | 1653 | 3503 |
| Utilities Cost Fac | 25 | \$341 | \$561 |
| RPMA Cost Fac | 35 | \$1,034 | \$1,043 |
| MILCON Cost Factor | 19 | 0.89 | 0.92 |
| OPERATION EFFICIENCY | ---- 150 | 8.2 | 5.2 |
| Buildable Acres | 15 | 992 | 423 |
| Total Structure SF | 39 | 16,895,816 | 8,213,882 |
| Encroachment | 21 | 48 | 1,462 |
| Environment | 36 | 1.4 | 8.7 |
| Water/Sewage | 39 | 7.9 | 6.8 |
| EXPANDABILITY | ---- 150 | 5.4 | 4.4 |
| SCORE | 1000 | 7.3 | 4.0 |
| RANK | | 1 | 9 |

MILITARY VALUE SPREADSHEET SUMMARY
IET/BRANCH SCHOOL INSTALLATIONS

| | | Fort Gordon, GA | Fort Huachuca, AZ |
|----------------------|----------|--------------------|----------------------|
| | WEIGHT | | |
| Multi-function | 41 | 30 | 30 |
| Army Readiness | 34 | 8 | 9 |
| Unique Capability | 62 | N | Y |
| Maneuver/Tng Acres | 27 | 45,659 | 55,747 |
| Maneuver Contigiou | 16 | 38,665 | 20,263 |
| Impact Rgn Acres | 28 | 4,979 | 11,985 |
| Deployment (Trans) | 16 | 7.4 | 3.2 |
| RC/Area Support | 26 | 2.2 | 1.7 |
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY | ---- 250 | 3.2 | 4.4 |
| Gen Instr Fac | 42 | 129,000 | 171,000 |
| Applied Instr Fac | 48 | 1,342,000 | 108,000 |
| Ranges (BRM) | 29 | 3.4 | 0.9 |
| Maintenance Fac | 25 | 80,000 | 336,000 |
| Admin/Operations | 25 | 551,000 | 586,000 |
| Info Msn Area Spt | 27 | 1,200 | 1,240 |
| Medical Facilities | 25 | 9 | 2 |
| Construct Invest | 29 | 63 | 82 |
| MISSION SUITABILITY | ---- 250 | 4.7 | 2.2 |
| Percent Permanent | 23 | 77.7% | 86.1% |
| TRADOC IOE Score | 15 | 5.03 | ? |
| AFH | 28 | 5,307 | 4,006 |
| Officer UPH | 26 | 986 | 498 |
| UEPH & Trainee | 38 | 10,703 | 2,653 |
| Community Fac (SF) | 30 | 748,000 | 627,000 |
| Places Rated Alamc | 16 | 199 | ? |
| Medical Support | 24 | 2 | 26 |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | ---- 200 | 4.2 | 1.3-2.9 |
| VHA | 12 | \$23.14 | \$20.39 |
| AFH Costs per DU | 15 | \$4,938 | \$2,871 |
| Avg Civ Salary | 11 | \$28,781 | \$31,790 |
| Wage Rate WG 8/3 | 10 | \$10.96 | \$12.50 |
| BASOPS MER Factor | 11 | 0.102 | 0.169 |
| BASOPS CER Factor | 12 | 4100 | 3705 |
| Utilities Cost Fac | 25 | \$426 | \$617 |
| RPMA Cost Fac | 35 | \$1,227 | \$1,468 |
| MILCON Cost Factor | 19 | 0.88 | 1.12 |
| OPERATION EFFICIENCY | ---- 150 | 6.6 | 4.4 |
| Buildable Acres | 15 | 2,323 | 2,015 |
| Total Structure SF | 39 | 9,701,379 | 7,782,906 |
| Encroachment | 21 | 207 | 15 |
| Environment | 36 | 9.6 | 9.4 |
| Water/Sewage | 39 | 7.4 | 6.9 |
| EXPANDABILITY | ---- 150 | 6.3 | 5.8 |
| SCORE | 1000 | 4.7 | 3.4-3.8 |
| RANK | | 6 | 12 |

MILITARY VALUE SPREADSHEET SUMMARY
IET/BRANCH SCHOOL INSTALLATIONS

| | | Fort Jackson, SC | Fort Knox, KY |
|----------------------|----------|---------------------|------------------|
| | WEIGHT | | |
| Multi-function | 41 | 10 | 25 |
| Army Readiness | 34 | 3 | 10 |
| Unique Capability | 62 | N | N |
| Maneuver/Tng Acres | 27 | 40,747 | 47,994 |
| Maneuver Contigiou | 16 | 40,747 | 14,510 |
| Impact Rgn Acres | 28 | 6,422 | 53,112 |
| Deployment (Trans) | 16 | 6.5 | 6.4 |
| RC/Area Support | 26 | 4.7 | 6.8 |
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY | ---- 250 | 1.8 | 4.4 |
| Gen Instr Fac | 42 | 96,000 | 249,000 |
| Applied Instr Fac | 48 | 399,000 | 666,000 |
| Ranges (BRM) | 29 | 3.8 | 5.9 |
| Maintenance Fac | 25 | 266,000 | 914,000 |
| Admin/Operations | 25 | 748,000 | 1,013,000 |
| Info Msn Area Spt | 27 | 1,215 | 1,200 |
| Medical Facilities | 25 | 6 | 5 |
| Construct Invest | 29 | 143 | 137 |
| MISSION SUITABILITY | ---- 250 | 3.7 | 5.5 |
| Percent Permanent | 23 | 81.8% | 84.1% |
| TRADOC IOE Score | 15 | 2.00 | 6.78 |
| AFH | 28 | 4,767 | 8,343 |
| Officer UPH | 26 | 262 | 1,007 |
| UEPH & Trainee | 38 | 16,630 | 12,385 |
| Community Fac (SF) | 30 | 874,000 | 1,539,000 |
| Places Rated Alamc | 16 | 115 | 8 |
| Medical Support | 24 | 27 | 23 |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | ---- 200 | 4.4 | 5.4 |
| VHA | 12 | \$47.51 | \$0.00 |
| AFH Costs per DU | 15 | \$3,622 | \$5,001 |
| Avg Civ Salary | 11 | \$27,847 | \$28,060 |
| Wage Rate WG 8/3 | 10 | \$10.44 | \$12.03 |
| BASOPS MER Factor | 11 | 0.117 | 0.128 |
| BASOPS CER Factor | 12 | 2556 | 2118 |
| Utilities Cost Fac | 25 | \$559 | \$500 |
| RPMA Cost Fac | 35 | \$983 | \$1,195 |
| MILCON Cost Factor | 19 | 0.82 | 0.98 |
| OPERATION EFFICIENCY | ---- 150 | 7.0 | 6.7 |
| Buildable Acres | 15 | 2,400 | 2,000 |
| Total Structure SF | 39 | 10,347,087 | 17,555,044 |
| Encroachment | 21 | 370 | 129 |
| Environment | 36 | 9.6 | 10.0 |
| Water/Sewage | 39 | 9.3 | 6.4 |
| EXPANDABILITY | ---- 150 | 7.1 | 7.3 |
| SCORE | 1000 | 4.4 | 5.7 |
| RANK | | 8 | 3 |

**MILITARY VALUE SPREADSHEET SUMMARY
IET/BRANCH SCHOOL INSTALLATIONS**

| | | Fort Lee, VA | Fort Leonard Wood, MO |
|----------------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| | WEIGHT | | |
| Multi-function | 41 | 30 | 20 |
| Army Readiness | 34 | 6 | 8 |
| Unique Capability | 62 | N | N |
| Maneuver/Tng Acres | 27 | 2,105 | 41,918 |
| Maneuver Contigiou | 16 | 415 | 8,800 |
| Impact Rgn Acres | 28 | 1,400 | 19,000 |
| Deployment (Trans) | 16 | 7.1 | 3.2 |
| RC/Area Support | 26 | 1.5 | 4.7 |
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY | ---- 250 | 2.4 | 2.8 |
| Gen Instr Fac | 42 | 572,000 | 199,000 |
| Applied Instr Fac | 48 | 309,000 | 472,000 |
| Ranges (BRM) | 29 | 0.6 | 5.0 |
| Maintenance Fac | 25 | 153,000 | 332,000 |
| Admin/Operations | 25 | 675,000 | 673,000 |
| Info Msn Area Spt | 27 | 630 | 1,185 |
| Medical Facilities | 25 | 2 | 7 |
| Construct Invest | 29 | 74 | 114 |
| MISSION SUITABILITY | ---- 250 | 2.4 | 4.2 |
| Percent Permanent | 23 | 83.5% | 80.7% |
| TRADOC IOE Score | 15 | 5.21 | 4.72 |
| AFH | 28 | 4,525 | 4,451 |
| Officer UPH | 26 | 991 | 775 |
| UEPH & Trainee | 38 | 4,470 | 13,437 |
| Community Fac (SF) | 30 | 460,000 | 833,000 |
| Places Rated Alamc | 16 | 26 | ? |
| Medical Support | 24 | 13 | 16 |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | ---- 200 | 3.2 | 3.8-4.6 |
| VHA | 12 | \$78.83 | \$3.96 |
| AFH Costs per DU | 15 | \$6,969 | \$3,502 |
| Avg Civ Salary | 11 | \$29,495 | \$27,724 |
| Wage Rate WG 8/3 | 10 | \$11.40 | \$10.92 |
| BASOPS MER Factor | 11 | 0.138 | 0.102 |
| BASOPS CER Factor | 12 | 3891 | 2891 |
| Utilities Cost Fac | 25 | \$440 | \$172 |
| RPMA Cost Fac | 35 | \$1,909 | \$1,181 |
| MILCON Cost Factor | 19 | 0.87 | 0.96 |
| OPERATION EFFICIENCY | ---- 150 | 4.7 | 8.0 |
| Buildable Acres | 15 | 700 | 5,330 |
| Total Structure SF | 39 | 7,163,968 | 11,908,175 |
| Encroachment | 21 | 102 | 40 |
| Environment | 36 | 9.6 | 8.2 |
| Water/Sewage | 39 | 7.1 | 5.8 |
| EXPANDABILITY | ---- 150 | 5.6 | 6.0 |
| SCORE | 1000 | 3.4 | 4.6-4.8 |
| RANK | | 13 | 6 |

MILITARY VALUE SPREADSHEET SUMMARY
IET/BRANCH SCHOOL INSTALLATIONS

| | | Fort McClellan, AL | Fort Rucker, AL |
|----------------------|----------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| | WEIGHT | | |
| Multi-function | 41 | 30 | 25 |
| Army Readiness | 34 | 8 | 10 |
| Unique Capability | 62 | N | Y |
| Maneuver/Tng Acres | 27 | 36,735 | 56,859 |
| Maneuver Contigiou | 16 | 17,486 | 5,778 |
| Impact Rgn Acres | 28 | 4,969 | 12,476 |
| Deployment (Trans) | 16 | 4.9 | 7.2 |
| RC/Area Support | 26 | 4.6 | 3.5 |
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY | ---- 250 | 3.3 | 5.1 |
| Gen Instr Fac | 42 | 478,000 | 240,000 |
| Applied Instr Fac | 48 | 175,000 | 159,000 |
| Ranges (BRM) | 29 | 2.0 | 0.2 |
| Maintenance Fac | 25 | 80,000 | 460,000 |
| Admin/Operations | 25 | 573,000 | 203,000 |
| Info Msn Area Spt | 27 | 1,300 | 635 |
| Medical Facilities | 25 | 2 | 1 |
| Construct Invest | 29 | 86 | 141 |
| MISSION SUITABILITY | ---- 250 | 3.0 | 1.8 |
| Percent Permanent | 23 | 85.2% | 73.4% |
| TRADOC IOE Score | 15 | 5.01 | 3.29 |
| AFH | 28 | 2,867 | 7,732 |
| Officer UPH | 26 | 475 | 1,887 |
| UEPH & Trainee | 38 | 9,340 | 3,603 |
| Community Fac (SF) | 30 | 541,000 | 518,000 |
| Places Rated Alamc | 16 | 282 | 299 |
| Medical Support | 24 | 25 | 32 |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | ---- 200 | 2.6 | 2.1 |
| VHA | 12 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 |
| AFH Costs per DU | 15 | \$4,985 | \$3,399 |
| Avg Civ Salary | 11 | \$28,839 | \$28,473 |
| Wage Rate WG 8/3 | 10 | \$10.90 | \$9.93 |
| BASOPS MER Factor | 11 | 0.111 | 0.190 |
| BASOPS CER Factor | 12 | 3295 | 3479 |
| Utilities Cost Fac | 25 | \$317 | \$219 |
| RPMA Cost Fac | 35 | \$1,694 | \$1,102 |
| MILCON Cost Factor | 19 | 0.79 | 0.85 |
| OPERATION EFFICIENCY | ---- 150 | 6.8 | 7.2 |
| Buildable Acres | 15 | 2,657 | 565 |
| Total Structure SF | 39 | 6,807,139 | 7,660,387 |
| Encroachment | 21 | 78 | 81 |
| Environment | 36 | 9.7 | 10.0 |
| Water/Sewage | 39 | 5.8 | 5.5 |
| EXPANDABILITY | ---- 150 | 5.2 | 5.1 |
| SCORE | 1000 | 3.9 | 4.0 |
| RANK | | 11 | 9 |

MILITARY VALUE SPREADSHEET SUMMARY
IET/BRANCH SCHOOL INSTALLATIONS

| | | Fort Sam Houston w/Bullis, TX | Fort Sill, OK |
|----------------------|---------------|----------------------------------|------------------|
| | WEIGHT | | |
| Multi-function | 41 | 30 | 35 |
| Army Readiness | 34 | 9 | 10 |
| Unique Capability | 62 | N | N |
| Maneuver/Tng Acres | 27 | 22,458 | 22,499 |
| Maneuver Contigiou | 16 | 21,685 | 7,500 |
| Impact Rgn Acres | 28 | 6,013 | 32,900 |
| Deployment (Trans) | 16 | 7.5 | 7.3 |
| RC/Area Support | 26 | 5.6 | 5.6 |
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY | ---- 250 | 4.0 | 4.5 |
| Gen Instr Fac | 42 | 75,000 | 714,000 |
| Applied Instr Fac | 48 | 525,000 | 159,000 |
| Ranges (BRM) | 29 | 1.9 | 2.2 |
| Maintenance Fac | 25 | 346,000 | 596,000 |
| Admin/Operations | 25 | 1,096,000 | 1,849,000 |
| Info Msn Area Spt | 27 | 895 | 650 |
| Medical Facilities | 25 | 7 | 3 |
| Construct Invest | 29 | 37 | 164 |
| MISSION SUITABILITY | ---- 250 | 3.1 | 4.7 |
| Percent Permanent | 23 | 90.2% | 85.2% |
| TRADOC IOE Score | 15 | ? | 3.74 |
| AFH | 28 | 27,162 | 14,025 |
| Officer UPH | 26 | 2,739 | 1,178 |
| UEPH & Trainee | 38 | 11,528 | 14,181 |
| Community Fac (SF) | 30 | 735,000 | 940,000 |
| Places Rated Alamc | 16 | 100 | 295 |
| Medical Support | 24 | 3 | 20 |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | ---- 200 | 6.8-7.5 | 5.0 |
| VHA | 12 | \$46.54 | \$0.12 |
| AFH Costs per DU | 15 | \$9,915 | \$6,536 |
| Avg Civ Salary | 11 | \$26,900 | \$27,543 |
| Wage Rate WG 8/3 | 10 | \$10.34 | \$12.09 |
| BASOPS MER Factor | 11 | 0.123 | 0.103 |
| BASOPS CER Factor | 12 | 2697 | 2255 |
| Utilities Cost Fac | 25 | \$511 | \$321 |
| RPMA Cost Fac | 35 | \$1,412 | \$1,647 |
| MILCON Cost Factor | 19 | 0.88 | 0.81 |
| OPERATION EFFICIENCY | ---- 150 | 5.4 | 7.4 |
| Buildable Acres | 15 | 335 | 10,352 |
| Total Structure SF | 39 | 14,708,850 | 14,428,597 |
| Encroachment | 21 | 943 | 36 |
| Environment | 36 | 9.1 | 9.0 |
| Water/Sewage | 39 | 8.4 | 6.2 |
| EXPANDABILITY | ---- 150 | 6.7 | 7.3 |
| SCORE | 1000 | 4.9-5.1 | 5.5 |
| RANK | | 5 | 4 |

RELATIVE MILITARY VALUE ARRAY
IET/BRANCH SCHOOL INSTALLATIONS

| | 0 | SCORES | | | | 10 | | | | |
|------------------------------------|---|--------|---|---|---|----|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Fort Bliss, TX | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
| 2 Fort Benning, GA | . | . | . | . | . | . | X | . | . | . |
| 3 Fort Knox, KY | . | . | . | . | . | X | . | . | . | . |
| 4 Fort Sill, OK | . | . | . | . | . | X | . | . | . | . |
| 5 Fort Sam Houston w/Bullis, TX | . | . | . | . | . | X | . | . | . | . |
| 6 Fort Gordon, GA | . | . | . | . | . | X | . | . | . | . |
| 6 Fort Leonard Wood, MO | . | . | . | . | . | X | . | . | . | . |
| 8 Fort Jackson, SC | . | . | . | . | . | X | . | . | . | . |
| 9 Fort Rucker, AL | . | . | . | . | . | X | . | . | . | . |
| 9 Fort Eustis w/Ft Story, Virginia | . | . | . | . | . | X | . | . | . | . |
| 11 Fort McClellan, AL | . | . | . | . | . | X | . | . | . | . |
| 12 Fort Huachuca, AZ | . | . | . | . | . | X | . | . | . | . |

RELATIVE MILITARY VALUE ARRAY
 IET/BRANCH SCHOOL INSTALLATIONS
 (CONTINUED)

| | 0 | | | | | SCORES | | | | 10 | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|---|---|---|----|-----------------------|
| 13 Fort Lee, VA | ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ | . | . | . | . | ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ | . | . | . | . | ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ |
| | | | X | | | | | | | | |
| 14 Fort Ben Harrison, IN | ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ | . | . | . | . | ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ | . | . | . | . | ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ |
| | | | | X | | | | | | | |

NOTE:

This quantitative assessment provides a starting point in the evaluation of the Army's base structure. It does not produce a decision on which base should close or be realigned. Although the assessment offers a logical basis for judging possible opportunities for closure and realignment, it is just one element in the Army's overall evaluation.

The comparative rankings established by the model pass the "common sense" test and provide a point of departure from which a detailed analysis of the realignment and closure potential of the installation can begin. This ranking does not provide a "close this installation first" listing. There are several installation unique considerations which may not be captured through the use of standard, uniform criteria. The installation unique capabilities and functions must be considered before any decision to close or realign an installation is made. This was accomplished in Phase II of the Army process.

4. ROLE FINAL CRITERIA PLAYED IN THE DECISION PROCESS

The military value (Criteria 1-4) and return on investment (Criterion 5) were the driving factors in the decisions to close or realign IET/Branch Schools.

Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) missions will evolve to meet the needs of the Army, but will fundamentally remain to develop leaders, train individuals, develop doctrine, design Army forces, establish equipment requirements and provide mission support facilities.

TRADOC fulfills its purpose and carries out its missions through branch schools. The branch school represents the fundamental building block for TRADOC- organizationally and for stationing.

With mission execution founded on the branch school, an integrated function is required to bring together the contributions of the various branch schools to the combined arms team. The Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth integrates the work of the combat and combat support arms schools and does much original work across all the arms. The Combat Arms Support Command at Fort Lee provides similar functions focused on combat service support.

Base closure will provide opportunities to collocate branch schools. The key will be to bring together schools which will pay off in battlefield integration through joint study and analysis. Savings in school overhead and Base Operations (BASOPS) will flow from reducing the number of TRADOC operating locations (installations).

The economic impact (Criterion 6) on the recommendations predicts a 1.1 percent drop in the number of jobs in the surrounding area to Fort Benjamin Harrison (Indianapolis), Indiana. The increase in number of jobs to the surrounding area of Fort Jackson may be 1.9 percent and 3.8 percent at Fort Knox.

The closure of Fort McClellan may result in a drop in the number of jobs to the surrounding community of 18.1 percent. There may be an increase of 16.4 percent in the number of jobs to the surrounding area of Fort Leonard Wood. Additional jobs in the Fort Huachuca area are predicted to be less than one percent.

The infrastructure (Criterion 7) of the potential receiving communities will support the forces, missions and personnel changes being recommended.

The environmental impact (Criterion 8) on the receiving sites appear to be minor for the move of the Soldier Support Center to Fort Jackson and USAREC to Fort Knox. The

environmental impact of the Chemical and Military Police Schools potential move to Fort Leonard Wood require additional study. The environmental impact of the DoD Polygraph School to Fort Huachuca appears to be minor.

A summary of these environmental impacts are in section 5.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPACTS

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Realign the Soldier Support Center (Army Adjutant General School and Finance School) from Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN to Fort Jackson, SC.

- Retain the Department of Defense Finance and Accounting Services/Indianapolis Center in Building 1, Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN. Carve out part of Fort Benjamin Harrison for use by the Army Reserves. Retain the Personnel Specialist (75 D/E) Combat Service Support Advance Individual Training load and cadre at Fort Jackson, instead of realigning them to Fort Benjamin Harrison (BRAC I change). Close the remainder of Fort Benjamin Harrison.

- Divert the realignment of the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) from Fort Sheridan, IL to Fort Benjamin Harrison, a BRAC I action, to Fort Knox, KY. Concurrently, the Army is considering exercising its discretionary authority under Public Law 100-526 to divert the relocation of the Air Base Ground Defense school from Fort Dix, NJ, to Fort Knox, KY, to Fort Benning, GA.

- Realign the Army Chemical and Military Police schools from Fort McClellan, AL to Fort Leonard Wood, MO to form the Maneuver Support Center along with the Engineer School. Realign the Department of Defense Polygraph School from Fort McClellan to Fort Huachuca, AZ. Carve out part of Fort McClellan for use by the Army Reserve. License Pelham Range to the Alabama Army National Guard. Carve out selected facilities on Fort McClellan for use by the Alabama Army National Guard. Place the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF) at Fort McClellan in caretaker status. Close Fort McClellan.

Approval of these recommendations will result in overall improvements in efficiencies in the IET/Branch Schools for the United States Army Adjutant General, Finance, Chemical, Military Police and Engineer Branches. Additional efficiencies will occur by excessing expensive properties with low military utility.

RETURN ON INVESTMENT (COBRA MODEL)

The Cost of Base Closure and Realignment Actions (COBRA) model used for ranking alternative closure/realignment actions distributes costs into six major categories. They are Mission, Personnel, Overhead, Construction, Moving, and Other. A short explanation and description on each category follows:

Mission: Direct mission costs are not addressed in this exercise. However, those changes in mission costs resulting from a closure or realignment action are estimated and are captured in this element.

Personnel: This cost category captures all those costs associated with military and civilian pay and allowances (not including closure generated Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves.) Besides savings of service funded salaries due to decreases in authorizations, differentials in variable housing allowance and/or basic allowance for quarters are also included.

Overhead: Changes in Real Property Maintenance, Base Operations and Support, and Family Housing maintenance requirements are the primary components of Overhead. Costs associated with the mothballing and caretaking of an installation are also included as are administrative and support costs generated in the accomplishment of a closure or realignment.

Construction: Military construction (MILCON) costs and avoidances are the components here. MILCON includes estimates for design; supervision, inspection, and overhead; contingency; and site preparation. Site preparation includes infrastructure requirements to support the construction.

Moving: Moving contains all freight and per diem costs incurred in the movement of personnel and material. Included are mileage, Reimbursement of Income Tax assessment, househunting, home sale/purchase reimbursement, household goods, packing, storage, loss. The military PCS cost is computed for all military authorizations being moved. This amount is reduced by the amount of routine military PCS costs included in the composite military salary factor.

Other: This category contains a disparate compendium of cost elements. Some of these should be included in the previous categories and will be in future versions of COBRA. The costs elements included here are CHAMPUS, cost for new hires, homeowners assistance, unemployment, information management area (associated with MILCON), environmental mitigation, other one-time costs, procurement cost avoidance, and land sales/purchase. Also addressed are additional personnel costs such as reduction-

in-force pay, excess annual leave payments, and priority placement PCS costs.

In addition to the above cost breakout, the Realignment Summary includes information on the 20-year net present value of the option, the total one-time costs, the years to break even, the return on investment years (defined earlier in this report).

Realignment summaries for each proposal are on the following pages. A brief discussion of these summaries are below.

- Realign Soldier Support Center to Fort Jackson and Close Fort Benjamin Harrison. The key cost in this option is for construction of instructional facilities at Fort Jackson. Moving costs appear high as the COBRA model calculates PCS costs for students during personnel migrations. These student PCS costs were accounted for as a cost avoidance as students typically report directly to the installation providing the course of instruction. Savings are generated by the sale of excessed property. Additionally, savings are accrued due to the excessing of an installation which has a high real property maintenance cost. This option does not include the USAREC personnel realignment to Building 1, Fort Benjamin Harrison in FY93 (a BRAC I action).

- Realignment USAREC to Fort Knox. The key cost in this option is for rehabilitation of facilities (construction), a cost similar to the requirements in BRAC I, at Fort Benjamin Harrison. Key savings continue to be the closure of Fort Sheridan.

- Realign Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood; realign DoD Polygraph School to Fort Huachuca; and, close Fort McClellan. The key costs in this option are for rehabilitation and new construction at Fort Leonard Wood, Fort Huachuca and Fort McClellan for the Alabama Army National Guard. Moving costs appear high as the COBRA model calculates PCS costs for students during personnel migrations. These student PCS costs were accounted for as a cost avoidance as students typically report directly to the installation providing the course of instruction. Savings are accrued due to the closure of Fort McClellan and the sale of excessed property. The cost to reconstruct the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility is not included in this option.

Realignment Summary
 Realign Soldier Support Center to Fort Jackson
 and
 Close Fort Benjamin Harrison

REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA Ver 1.23)

| | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---------|---------|----------------------|---|----------------------|
| Option NPV20 | (\$K) : | -183636 | Losing Base | : | Ft. Ben Harrison |
| Total One-Time Cost | (\$K) : | 82766 | Group | : | IET/BR SCHOOL |
| Years to Break Even | : | 5 | Service | : | US Army |
| ROI Years | : | 0 | Option Package | : | SSC- Ft. Jackson(\$) |
| Strategy : | | | Baseline Year : 1991 | | |
| (1-Transfer, 2-Close, 3-Deactivate) | | | | | |

| | Net Cost (\$K) | | | | | | | Constant Dollars |
|------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|------------------|
| | Year1 1992 | Year2 1993 | Year3 1994 | Year4 1995 | Year5 1996 | Year6 1997 | Beyond | |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Personnel | 0 | 0 | 0 | -24 | -146 | -11799 | -26056 | |
| Overhead | 741 | 555 | 917 | 296 | -3008 | -9950 | -10126 | |
| Construct | -1964 | 0 | 44317 | 3411 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Moving | 0 | 0 | 19 | 1560 | 8034 | 9215 | 0 | |
| Other | 170 | 170 | 596 | 335 | -2813 | -100524 | 0 | |
| NET | -1053 | 725 | 45849 | 5578 | 2067 | -113058 | -36182 | |

NOTE: (-) Indicates a savings.
 (+) Indicates a cost.

Realignment Summary
 Realign USAREC to Fort Benjamin Harrison *

REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA Ver 1.23)

| | | | | |
|---------------------|---------|--------|----------------|-------------------------|
| Option NPV20 | (\$K) : | -67380 | Losing Base | : FT. SHERIDAN |
| Total One-Time Cost | (\$K) : | 32750 | Group | : USAREC |
| Years to Break Even | : | 4 | Service | : US Army |
| ROI Years | : | 2 | Option Package | : USAREC to Ft Harrison |

Strategy : 1 Baseline Year : 1991
 (1-Transfer, 2-Close, 3-Deactivate)

| | Net Cost (\$K) Constant Dollars | | | | | | |
|------------|---------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | Year1 1992 | Year2 1993 | Year3 1994 | Year4 1995 | Year5 1996 | Year6 1997 | Beyond |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Personnel | 0 | -505 | -505 | -505 | -505 | -505 | -505 |
| Overhead | 1105 | -11504 | -11126 | -11260 | -11360 | -11435 | -11660 |
| Construct | 19231 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Moving | 0 | 7783 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other | 952 | 1497 | 167 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| NET | 21288 | -2729 | -11465 | -11765 | -11865 | -11940 | -12165 |

* See Realignment Summary, Additive Savings, Realign USAREC to Fort Knox for net impact.

NOTE: (-) Indicates a savings.
 (+) Indicates a cost.

Realignment Summary
 Realign USAREC to Fort Knox *

REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA Ver 1.23)

| | | | | |
|---------------------|---------|--------|----------------|----------------------|
| Option NPV20 | (\$K) : | -79446 | Losing Base | : FT. SHERIDAN |
| Total One-Time Cost | (\$K) : | 28344 | Group | : USAREC |
| Years to Break Even | : | 3 | Service | : US Army |
| ROI Years | : | 0 | Option Package | : USAREC TO FT. KNOX |

Strategy : 1
 (1-Transfer, 2-Close, 3-Deactivate) Baseline Year : 1991

| | Net Cost (\$K) | | | | | | Constant Dollars | | | |
|------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | Year1 1992 | Year2 1993 | Year3 1994 | Year4 1995 | Year5 1996 | Year6 1997 | Year6 1997 | Year6 1997 | Year6 1997 | Beyond |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Personnel | 0 | -743 | -743 | -743 | -743 | -743 | -743 | -743 | -743 | -743 |
| Overhead | 949 | -11577 | -11598 | -11732 | -11832 | -11907 | -11907 | -11907 | -11907 | -12132 |
| Construct | 1073 | 0 | 14380 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Moving | 0 | 7823 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other | 167 | 1497 | 284 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| NET | 2189 | -3000 | 2323 | -12474 | -12574 | -12649 | -12649 | -12649 | -12649 | -12875 |

* See Realignment Summary, Additive Savings, Realign USAREC to Fort Knox for net impact.
 NOTE: (-) Indicates a savings.
 (+) Indicates a cost.

Realignment Summary
 Additive Savings *
 Realign USAREC to Fort Knox

REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA Ver 1.23)

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------|--------|----------------|--|
| Option NPV20 | (\$K): | -11507 | Losing Base | : Ft. Sheridan |
| Total On-Time Cost(\$K): | | -4406 | Group | : USAREC |
| Years to Break Even | : | 3 | Service | : US Army |
| ROI Years | : | 0 | Option Package | : USAREC to FT. Knox vis FT. Harrison |
| Strategy | : | 1 | Baseline | : 1991 |
| (1-Transfer, 2-Close, 3-Deactivate) | | | | |

| | Net Cost (\$K) | | | | | | Constant Dollars | |
|------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|-------------|
| | Year 1 1992 | Year 2 1993 | Year 3 1994 | Year 4 1995 | Year 5 1996 | Year 6 1997 | Beyond | |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Personnel | 0 | -238 | -238 | -238 | -238 | -238 | -238 | |
| Overhead | -156 | -73 | -472 | -472 | -472 | -472 | -472 | |
| Construct | -18158 | 0 | 14380 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Moving | 0 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Other | -785 | 0 | 117 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| NET | -19099 | -271 | 13787 | -710 | -710 | -710 | -710 | -710 |

* These savings are accrued over and above those anticipated by the BRAC I action to close Fort Sheridan, IL.

NOTE: (-) Indicates a savings.
(+) Indicates a cost.

Realignment Summary
 Realign Chemical and Military Police Schools
 to Fort Leonard Wood
 and
 Realign DOD Polygraph School to Fort Huachuca
 Close Fort McClellan

REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA Ver 1.23)

| | | | | |
|---------------------|---------|--------|----------------|-----------------|
| Option NPV20 | (\$K) : | -85646 | Losing Base | : Ft. McClellan |
| Total One-Time Cost | (\$K) : | 103931 | Group | : IET/BR SCHOOL |
| Years to Break Even | : | 8 | Service | : US Army |
| ROI Years | : | 2 | Option Package | : FLW (w/ \$) |

Strategy : 3 Baseline Year : 1991
 (1-Transfer, 2-Close, 3-Deactivate)

| | Net Cost (\$K) | | | | | | Constant Dollars |
|------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|
| | Year1 1992 | Year2 1993 | Year3 1994 | Year4 1995 | Year5 1996 | Year6 1997 | |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Personnel | 0 | 0 | 0 | 638 | 3847 | -2282 | -15112 |
| Overhead | 1083 | 812 | 1339 | 349 | -6429 | -13081 | -20714 |
| Construct | 1773 | 0 | 38789 | 15152 | 6667 | 0 | 0 |
| Moving | 0 | 0 | 139 | 2002 | 10275 | 9950 | 0 |
| Other | 167 | 167 | 542 | 515 | -3768 | -40553 | 9554 |
| NET | 3023 | 979 | 40810 | 18655 | 10592 | -45965 | -26273 |

NOTE: (-) Indicates a savings.
 (+) Indicates a cost.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

Summaries of the environmental impacts for Fort Benning, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Fort Huachuca, Fort Jackson, Fort Knox, Fort Leonard Wood and Fort McClellan follow.

SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES RESULTING FROM REALIGNMENT ACTION AT:

FORT BENNING, GA

If selected for realignment action the following are considered the "environmental consequences" at Fort Benning, GA.

Pollution Control

Minimal

Realignment of Fort Benning will have minimal impact on air pollution emanating from various sources.

Programmed "environmental costs":

No Impact

Programmed environmental costs such as costs associated with Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) corrective action of solid waste management units, will not be affected by a mission realignment.

Cultural Resources

No Impact

No impact on cultural resources will occur as a result of this realignment.

Contaminated Sites/Hazardous Materials/Wastes

No Impact

The contamination which exists at Fort Benning has resulted from past waste disposal practices. This realignment will not impact current environmental investigations.

Threatened and Endangered Species

Minimal

Fort Benning has a Natural Resources Management Plan and Cooperative Agreement with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Wildlife at Fort Benning is protected and would not be impacted by a mission realignment.

Land and Air Uses/Wetlands

Minimal

Land: A small increase in mission involved in training activities could increase erosion of soil in training areas,

Air Uses: No impact.

Air Uses: No impact.

Wetlands: All wetland areas are protected under the Natural Resource Management Plan and would not be affected by a mission realignment.

SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
RESULTING FROM CLOSURE ACTION AT:

FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON, INDIANAPOLIS, IN

If selected for closure action the following are considered the "environmental consequences" at Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN.

Pollution Control

Minimal

Closure of the Installation will eliminate many air pollution sources.

Programmed "environmental costs":

Caution

Closure of the Installation is not expected to eliminate the need for expenditure of funds for pollution abatement programs. There will be some Remedial Action/Site Investigation (RI/FS) involved with closure of the installation. However, the scope of such a study is not expected to be large, and should not present a major impact.

Cultural Resources

Caution

Those buildings in the 1903 plan for the Fort Benjamin Harrison are potentially eligible for the National Register. The Post Office (Bldg 616) is listed individually on the National Register.

Contaminated Sites/Hazardous Materials/Wastes

Caution

Although studies performed at the Installation are not totally conclusive, what information which was available does not indicate that contaminated sites at Fort Benjamin Harrison would pose a major impact in the event of closure. Environmental programs appear to have any concerns well in hand. As of 1989, the Installation was conducting an Asbestos Removal and Abatement program. Open end contracts for ongoing mitigation of asbestos related problems are negotiated annually.

Threatened and Endangered Species

Caution

One threatened or endangered species, the Indiana Bat has been documented as occurring at Fort Ben Harrison.

Land and Air Uses/Wetlands

Caution

The predominate use of lands surrounding the installation is farming and residential. Though some remediation will be necessary should the Installation be closed, it should not be of major proportions.

Restoration Cost

Caution

The estimated cost of environmental restoration of property potentially available to be exceeded is \$4M to include studies. This work must be accomplished to sell the property.

SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
RESULTING FROM REALIGNMENT ACTION AT:

FORT HUACHUCA, AZ

SIERRA VISTA, AZ

If selected for realignment action, the following are considered the "environmental consequences" at Fort Huachuca, AZ.

Pollution Control

Minimal

Realignment to Fort Huachuca will have minimal effect on any air pollution emissions emanating from various sources.

Programmed "environmental costs":

Caution

Realignment to Fort Huachuca will not eliminate the need for expenditure of funds for environmental investigations. A sampling and analysis program should be conducted to determine the extent of any soil contamination at the landfill, former Fire-Fighter Training Area, the POL Storage Facility-Libby AAF, Military POL Filling Station, and the PX Service Station.

Cultural Resources

Caution

There are several areas and buildings at Fort Huachuca on or potentially eligible for the National Register.

Contaminated Sites/
Hazardous Materials/Wastes

Caution

The Installation Assessment of Fort Huachuca (1980), identified 24 locations of known or suspected waste materials attached figure 8. Most of these areas including 10 former landfills have never been sampled for contaminants. An update of this assessment was conducted in 1988 and found additional areas which may have released contaminants to the soil. As part of this report the U.S. EPA's Environmental Photographic Center (EPIC) performed a study in which it attempted to identify potential contamination areas using aerial photographs. Ten areas were added to the report as a result of the EPIC study. See attached Table 3-1, Figure 3-5, and Figure 3-6 for a summary of findings. The existing sanitary landfill has reached near capacity and alternatives need to be addressed.

Threatened and Endangered Species

Caution

Numerous threatened, endangered, and candidate sensitive wildlife species are known to occur at Fort Huachuca. These include raptors such as gray hawks and common black hawks as well as the recently listed endangered species sanborn's long-nosed bat. The post is currently in the first stages of development of a management plan for the species. The plan will involve

protection of roosting sites, preservation of large areas containing agaves and minimization of electronic and other activities potentially affecting the species. Much of these areas are currently not used intensively for military training activities.

Land and Air Uses/Wetlands

Minimal

Land: Much of the surrounding land is leased for grazing and agricultural uses. Range areas which contain unexploded ordnance will need surface sweeping and clearing prior to property release for similar use.

Air Uses: The nature of the proposed relocation to Fort Huachuca should not significantly impact existing noise contours.

Wetlands: Information on wetlands was not available however, due to the arid desert climate, the presence of wetlands should be minimal.

SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
RESULTING FROM REALIGNMENT ACTION AT:

FORT JACKSON

SOUTH CAROLINA

If selected for realignment action the following are considered the "environmental consequences" at Fort Jackson.

Pollution Control

Minimal

A small increase in training and personnel should have a very minor effect. This is based on the fact that Fort Jackson has minor environmental problems.

Programmed "environmental costs":

Minimal

Environmental compliance issues must continued to be addressed, but no significant increase in funding would be required by a small increase in training and personnel.

Cultural Resources

Unknown

Contaminated Sites/Hazardous Materials/Wastes

Minimal

Fort Jackson has five landfills. Three of these landfills are active. Two of the three active landfills are mainly for construction debris. No evidence of groundwater contamination has been found in conjunction with these landfills. Explosives and heavy metals contamination is possible at the Open Burning/Open Demolition areas and the firing ranges. Unexploded Ordnance potentially exist at the firing ranges. The Training Audiovisual Support Center (TASC) Hazardous Waste Storage Center contains heavily stained soils. Soil and groundwater sampling should be performed. An old PCB storage area has potential for PCB and heavy metal contamination.

Threatened and Endangered Species

No Impact

The red-cockaded woodpecker is the only endangered species known to inhabit the woods at Fort Jackson.

Land and Air Uses/Wetlands

Minimal

Land: Increased training and personnel may have a minimal impact on land usage. Land usage surrounding the installation ranges from urban to undeveloped.

Air: Not applicable.

Wetlands: Wetlands occur in the maneuver training areas.
However, sufficient land exists to avoid impacts.

SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
RESULTING FROM REALIGNMENT ACTION AT:

FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY

If selected for realignment action, the following are considered the "environmental consequences" at Fort Knox:

Pollution Control

Minimal

Realignment should not impact ongoing pollution control measures.

Programmed "environmental costs":

No Impact

Realignment should not have any impact on scheduled or ongoing environmental programs.

Cultural Resources

Minimal

Realignment should not impact any cultural resources located at Ft Knox.

Contaminated Sites/Hazardous Materials/Wastes

Minimal

Realignment should reduce the impact on sites such as impact areas (decreased amounts of unexploded ordnance in the area). The use of petroleum, oil, and lubricants and their disposal may also be reduced.

Threatened and Endangered Species

Minimal

Threatened and endangered species at Fort Knox should not be impacted by realignment.

Land and Air Uses/Wetlands

Minimal

There should not be any impacts to land and air uses due to realignment. Realignment activities would have to avoid flood plain areas as appropriate.

SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
RESULTING FROM REALIGNMENT ACTION AT:

FORT LEONARD WOOD, MISSOURI

If selected for realignment action, the following are considered the "environmental consequences" at Fort Leonard Wood (Fort Leonard Wood).

Pollution Control

Minimal

Realignment of Fort Leonard Wood will have minimal impact on air pollution emanating from various sources.

Programmed "environmental costs":

Minimal

Programmed environmental costs such as cost associated with Resource Conservation Reservation Act corrective actions, would not be affected by a mission realignment.

Cultural Resources

Caution

There are 20 historic and 5 archeological areas potentially eligible for appropriate registration. These should not interfere with proposed actions.

Contaminated Sites/Hazardous Materials/Wastes

Caution

Additional hazardous wastes would be generated if Fort Leonard Wood receives a chemical decontamination training facility. Binary chemical agents are used and DS-2 (decontamination solution) is employed in decontamination. This facility would also house an incinerator to dispose of wastes generated. The solid residue generated from this facility would have to be landfilled.

Threatened and Endangered Species

Impact

The two cave sites, reportedly serving as roosting sites for the Indiana Bat and the grey bat are located on Ft Leonard Wood. The sites inaccessible to the public.

Land and Air Uses/Wetlands

No Impact

Land: An increase in personnel and training could have a minimal impact on land use depending on type of realignment.

Air Uses: No impact.

Wetlands: No impact.

SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
RESULTING FROM CLOSURE ACTION AT:

FORT MCCLELLAN, AL

ANNISTON, AL

If selected for closure action, the following are considered the "environmental consequences" at Fort McClellan, AL.

Pollution Control

Eliminated

Closure of Fort McClellan will eliminate air pollution emanating from various sources.

Programmed "environmental costs":

Caution

Closure of Fort McClellan will not eliminate the need for expenditure of funds for pollution abatement programs. Prior to property transfer, any remedial action required to mitigate potential adverse impacts to human health or the environment should be performed.

Cultural Resources

Caution

There are a total of 129 historic and prehistoric sites identified at Fort McClellan.

Contaminated Sites/
Hazardous Materials/Wastes

Caution

An enhanced preliminary assessment (PA) for Fort McClellan was conducted by the Army in 1990. The PA identified 67 areas requiring environmental evaluation prior to property release. These areas were grouped by the following categories:

- Chemical Detoxification Training Facility (CDTF)
- Facilities/Maintenance Operations
- Training/Range Areas
- Storage Tanks
- Landfills, Quarries, and Borrow Pits
- Incinerators
- Toxic/Hazardous Materials Storage Areas
- Wastewater Treatment Plant
- Radiological Training/Storage/Disposal Areas
- Other Areas

Attached is a summary of all findings including recommendations for further action (Table 5-1). Identification and sampling of asbestos-containing materials (ACM) has been conducted at Fort McClellan since 1984. All remaining buildings should be surveyed for asbestos and mitigation prior to property release.

The CDTF will require special treatment to include disposal of toxic agents.

Threatened and Endangered Species

Minimal

Three species of plants and one species of fish were found which are recognized as endangered or threatened by Alabama biologists but because no State endangered species legislation exists, these species are not protected by law.

Land and Air Uses/Wetlands

Caution

Land: The Main Post is bordered by the city of Anniston. Some parts of the Main Post could be parceled with little additional environmental investigation.

Air Uses: Information on ICUZ study not available.

Wetlands: In all, 13 types of wetlands plant communities have been described on the reservation. Any remediation or base closure activities that would involve impacts to a wetlands area would require a delineation of that wetland.

Restoration Cost

Caution

The estimated cost of environmental restoration of property to be exccesed is \$32M to include studies. This work must be accomplished to sell the property. The cost of environmental restoration of the ranges is an additional \$220,000M.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS

FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON/FORT JACKSON/FORT KNOX

The economic impact on the recommendations associated with the realignments and closure of Fort Benjamin Harrison predicts a 1.1 percent drop in the number of jobs in the surrounding area to Fort Benjamin Harrison (Indianapolis), Indiana. The increase in the number of jobs to the surrounding area of Fort Jackson may be 1.9 percent. The realignment of USAREC to Fort Knox may result in an increase in the number of jobs of 3.8 percent at Fort Knox.

FORT MCCLELLAN/FORT LEONARD WOOD/FORT HUACHUCA

The closure of Fort McClellan may result in a drop in the number of jobs to the surrounding community of 18.1 percent. There may be an increase in the number of jobs of 16.4 percent to the surrounding area of Fort Leonard Wood. Additional jobs in the Fort Huachuca area are predicted to be less than one percent.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS

TAB E



Retain HQ ISC at Ft Haskins

**REPORT TO THE DEFENSE BASE
CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

TAB E: COMMAND AND CONTROL INSTALLATIONS

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
SECTION 1. CATEGORY DESCRIPTION

Mission Statement. The primary mission of the United States Army, in its simplest terms is to provide combat ready forces to the warfighting CINCs for their employment in non-combat operations, contingency operations, and war. U.S. Army Command and Control (C2) installations support that mission by providing the facilities through which the Army leadership commands, controls and manages the systems that allow the Army to generate combat and sustaining forces and formations in support of the CINCs. These installations house primarily, but not exclusively, non-deployable headquarters and activities which oversee the day-to-day functions that control the manning, equipping, training, and sustaining of the Army.

Installation List. The following installations have been classified as Command and Control posts:

- Fort Belvoir, VA.
- Fort Devens, MA.
- Fort Gillem, GA.
- Fort Hamilton, NY
- Fort McPherson, GA.
- Fort Meade, MD
- Fort Monroe, VA.
- Fort Myer, VA.
- Fort Ritchie, MD.
- Fort Shafter, HI.
- Fort Totten, NY

Category Map. The following map shows the geographic location of each Command and Control installation.



SECTION 2. CAPACITY ANALYSIS, SCREENING OF INSTALLATIONS

Purpose. The purpose of the capacity analysis was to determine if and where it made sense to realign or close a command and control installation. To accomplish this task the analysis was divided into two phases.

During Phase I the focus of the analysis was on measuring the military utility of Command and Control installations relative to other installations grouped in the same category.

The purpose of Phase I was to establish a baseline from which the Army could move forward in examining the reasonability and feasibility of realignment and closure scenarios.

The focus of Phase II was on how to best station the Army. Stationing the Army, in its simplest terms, is a function of the Army's operational requirements and the installations' capabilities and availabilities. Said simply, the Army positions its forces where they can best respond to real or potential threats to our National interests. In making these stationing decisions the Army must consider the cost of executing the stationing, i.e., the one time costs to move, construct, and equip, and the long term recurring operational costs of the stationing.

The purpose of Phase II was to determine if there were realignment and closure scenarios or options which were both reasonable and feasible. The scenarios should be reasonable operationally. To be reasonable an option must support how the Army envisions organizing itself in the future given the trends in funding, force structure, training, doctrine and strategy. To be feasible an option must be "doable". In this context "doable" means the option must be deemed affordable in terms of up-front costs and long term savings, it must be environmentally sound, and the Army must be able to complete the action within the legislated time frame.

Phase I Results. The Phase I analysis was quantitative in nature and focused on identifying and measuring specific, discrete attributes for each installation. When these attributes are taken as a whole they can reasonably be construed as portraying the military value or utility of an installation, compared to like facilities, in a fair and accurate manner. The Phase I analysis is discussed in greater detail in Section 3 of this annex.

The work done in Phase I produced what is known as a

relative military value array. This array depicts the military value of installations classified as Command and Control installations relative to others within the same classification. The array was produced using a model which evaluated specific, measurable attributes across all installations by assigning weights to the attributes based on their perceived importance in measuring the utility of the installation. The weighted attribute values were then added and divided by the total weight assigned producing a rating for each post. The ratings are then used to produce the military value array.

Generally speaking installations were assessed more favorably if they were larger, more economical to operate, or more modern. For example, posts with relatively large populations, multiple activities and missions, low operating costs and a high percentage of permanent facilities would fare better in the rankings than single mission posts with less numerous facilities.

The military value array should not be construed as a "keep this base open" or "close this base first" listing. Because of its quantitative nature, the military value array does not account for special considerations such as the installation's geographic location with respect to its supported units, critical functions or activities sited at the installation, or the unique capabilities or facilities the installation may possess. As such, the military value array was simply the base line from which the Army began its Phase II analysis.

Phase II Analysis. The first step in the Phase II analysis was the consideration of the Army Stationing Vision. This document was designed to provide a set of guiding principles for analysts and decision-makers when conducting stationing analyses. The Army Stationing Vision espouses the following Basing Strategy:

The foundation of the Army's basing strategy is to station units on high quality installations and match the best available installations to force requirements. However, the Army anticipates fewer installations in the inventory.

The Army will reduce the number of small, single purpose installations and those remaining will house organizations with highly site specific missions. Installations which do not adequately support their current missions or have little potential to accommodate future missions will be considered for closure or use by other activities. Similarly, the Army will actively seek to consolidate bases and functions, as appropriate, in

the face of decreasing resources, increasing urban encroachment, and a smaller force structure.

The national strategy will mold the Army into a smaller, readily deployable force which is primarily CONUS based. Stationing wisely on quality installations will provide the resources to train a combat ready force which can be generated, projected, and sustained in support of national strategy.

Points in the Basing Strategy which are key to the analysis of Command and Control installations are the following:

1) The Army anticipates a smaller installation infrastructure in the future.

2) Reductions in the size of the force and attendant funding require that the Army reduce its installation structure to retain the best combination of operationally sound and economically efficient installations.

3) The Army intends to reduce its small single purpose installations by consolidating missions, functions, and activities where appropriate.

Using these principles as a point of departure, the Army began its Phase II analysis. As stated earlier, the focus was on how to best station the Army to meet the needs of the force in the future.

How do we ensure that our installation structure will support the versatile, lethal, and deployable Army of tomorrow, realizing the Army will be smaller and the funding to support the Army will be less? The Army concluded that it would have to reduce the number of single mission, command and control installations and consolidate headquarters and management functions where it made sense to do so. Many of the consolidation initiatives were well under way as a result of the Defense Management Review and the Army's own Project Vanguard. In Phase II the intent was to compare the evolving force structure and command, control, and management philosophy with the current installation structure and design an installation infrastructure which would support the long term needs of the force.

Determining Reasonable Candidates.

The next step was to determine what posts might the Army reasonably be expected to realign or close as a result of the force structure reduction and management initiatives programmed over the next five years.

A reasonable option is one that supports the Army's

operational concept of the future, economic, environmental, and fiscal impacts notwithstanding. Normally, the Army will not realign a function or close a post, if there is an over-riding operational or strategic necessity for that function or installation.

In applying this test for reasonability to the Command and Control category the Army evaluated each installation on two levels: the strategic or long term requirements and the operational or mid-term requirements for the installation and its functions. All installations were analyzed for the long term or strategic implications of their realignment or closure. If an installation or the functions it supported were deemed as critical to national strategic interests or long term Army operations they were excluded from analysis at the operational/ mid-term level.

Strategic or Long-Term Implications of Realignment and Closures. An installation that supports strategic assets or facilities is one linked directly to the command and control of national assets or supports Unified or Specified commanders in their area of responsibility (AOR). An installation which supports the Army's long term requirements is site specific in its current location or one whose functions and operation cannot be disrupted for any period of time due to the sensitivity of the missions. The strategic or long term requirements for each installation were analyzed and the implications of their closure or realignment are summarized below.

Ft Belvoir, VA. Ft Belvoir is located in the National Capital Region (NCR) and contains the only land available to the Army, in the NCR proper, for expansion and consolidation. Under the provisions of the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988, Ft Belvoir is scheduled to receive the majority of the missions and activities from Cameron Station, VA, which was directed to be closed. This relocation will result in the infusion of over 3,000 additional workers on Ft Belvoir. Additionally, current plans call for an expansion of Ft Belvoir to include several activities currently located in leased space in the NCR. This expansion will save the Army a great deal of money currently expended in leases and make Ft Belvoir the hub of all Army activity in the NCR. Additionally, Ft Belvoir is the largest source of Army housing in the NCR, a region with extremely high housing costs, and as such these assets are key to providing well maintained, affordable housing for a large number of service members and their families. Ft Belvoir's assets are key to the Army's long term presence in the NCR and was excluded from further consideration for realignment or closure during this analysis.

Ft Devens, MA. Ft Devens is located approximately 45 miles west of Boston. Ft Devens is currently the home of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), the U.S. Army Intelligence School (ISC), Devens (ISD), and other smaller units. Under the provisions of the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988, the ISD will realign to Ft Huachuca, Az and the HQ, U.S. Army Information Systems Command (ISC) will realign from Ft Huachuca to Ft Devens. None of the functions located on Ft Devens are site specific. All current and programmed missions and activities could be relocated or redirected with little or no impact on Army operations. Ft Devens was not excluded and passed into the operational/ mid-term analysis.

Ft Gillem, GA. Ft Gillem is located in metropolitan Atlanta. It is a sub-post of Ft McPherson and supports the operation of HQ, United States Forces Command (FORSCOM), the 2nd U.S. Army, an Army-Air Force Exchange Service regional distribution center, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Lab. Ft Gillem's functions are inextricably linked to Ft McPherson and HQ, FORSCOM. The functions performed by the post support a significant portion of the daily operations of Ft McPherson and as such are site specific given HQ, FORSCOM remains at Ft McPherson. The realignment and or closure of Ft Gillem is dependant upon the actions taken at Ft McPherson, as such Ft Gillem was not excluded and passed into the operational/mid-term analysis with Ft McPherson.

Ft Hamilton, NY. Ft Hamilton is located in Brooklyn and supports the operations of the New York Area Command (NYAC). This post is the administrative hub of all Army activity in the New York metropolitan area. Its missions include law enforcement and security, protocol support, housing, and support to reserve components. While the mission is site specific to the New York area, disruption of activities during a realignment or consolidation would not cause any degradation in Army capabilities. Ft Hamilton was not excluded and passed into the operational/mid-term analysis.

Ft McPherson, GA. Ft McPherson is located in metropolitan Atlanta and is home to HQ, FORSCOM and the 3rd United States Army. The location of HQ, FORSCOM and 3rd Army are not site specific. FORSCOM's AOR includes the continental United States. As such, the headquarters could be located anywhere adequate facilities and transportation support were available. 3rd Army is the Army component to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and is a deployable

headquarters. The major requirements for this headquarters are adequate facilities and the ability to deploy in support of CENTCOM, neither of which are exclusively provided by Ft McPherson. Ft McPherson was not excluded and passed into the operational/mid-term analysis.

Ft Meade, MD. Ft Meade is located approximately 20 miles north of Washington D.C. and is the home of the 1st U.S. Army and the National Security Agency (NSA). Under the provisions of the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988, selected activities would realign to other posts from Ft Meade and approximately 9,000 acres of training area would be disposed of. Ft Meade's role in supporting the NSA is absolutely critical to national security. Any disruption of NSA's operation caused by realignment or closure activities would be unacceptable. Additionally, Ft Meade offers some expansion capability for the Army in the vicinity of the NCR. Ft Meade's role as the site of NSA activities is critical to national security and was excluded from further consideration for realignment or closure during this analysis.

Ft Monroe, VA. Ft Monroe is located in the Norfolk-Newport News area of coastal Virginia. This post is the home for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the U.S. Army Cadet Command. The location of HQ, TRADOC and Cadet Command are not site specific. Both commands control assets located throughout the continental United States. There is no strategic or long term requirement for these activities to remain in their current location. Ft Monroe was not excluded and passed into the operational/mid-term analysis.

Ft Myer, VA. Ft Myer is located in Arlington, Virginia and is home to the 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard), Military District of Washington headquarters activities, and a significant amount of family housing. The post directly supports the operation of Arlington National Cemetery and the extensive protocol requirements mandated within the Washington area. Ft Myer also provides a significant portion of the General Officer housing available in the NCR, including quarters for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Staff of the Army. Ft Myer's role in supporting the Army's long term operations in the NCR is critical and is expected to remain so for the foreseeable future. It was, therefore, excluded from further consideration for realignment or closure during this analysis.

Ft Ritchie, MD. Ft Ritchie is located in western Maryland approximately 70 miles northwest of Washington, D.C. and is home to the 7th Signal Command and supports the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC). The

ANMCC and the Air Force Emergency Operations Center (AFEOC) depend directly on the support and infrastructure at Ft Ritchie, as such Ft Ritchie's location is highly site specific. Because of Ft Ritchie's link to the ANMCC and other strategic command and control facilities it was excluded from further consideration for realignment or closure during this analysis.

Ft Shafter, HI. Ft Shafter is located on the island of Oahu and is home to the United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC), the Pacific Ocean Division of the Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii. Ft Shafter is the only U.S. Army Command and Control installation located in the Pacific theater. The installation supports the headquarters and planning functions for all Army forces assigned as elements of USARPAC, the Army component of the United States Pacific Command. While there are other installations on the islands, none of them have the capacity to absorb the functions currently stationed at Ft Shafter. Because of the missions Ft Shafter supports and because it is the only Army command and control installation in the theater, it was excluded from further consideration for realignment or closure during this analysis.

Ft Totten, NY. Ft Totten is located in Queens and supports the operations of the New York Area Command (NYAC) and reserve component training. The primary mission of Ft Totten is to serve as a regional reserve component training site. Ft Totten is a sub-post of Ft Hamilton and its future is linked to the decisions regarding NYAC. While the mission is site specific to the New York area, disruption of activities during a realignment or consolidation would not cause any degradation in Army capabilities. Ft Totten was not excluded and passed into the operational/mid-term analysis.

A summary of the strategic/long-term analysis reveals the following:

EXCLUDED FROM
FURTHER ANALYSIS

Ft Belvoir
Ft Meade
Ft Myer
Ft Ritchie
Ft Shafter

ANALYZE FOR
OPERATIONAL/MID-TERM IMPACTS

Ft Devens
Ft Gillem
Ft Hamilton
Ft McPherson
Ft Monroe
Ft Totten

Operational or Mid-Term Implications of Realignments and Closures. This assessment applied only to those installations not excluded during the strategic/long-term

review. The focus in this review was on how a realignment and/or closure would affect the Army in its day-to-day operations over the next five to seven years as the force is built down by 25%. The intent was to identify which installations were critical in the management of the build down because of the functions, activities or commands they currently support. Additionally, the installations were assessed on the basis of whether or not the missions they perform would be required in the future and if so would they have to remain in their current location or geographic area. The assessment of each installation given the previous considerations follows:

Ft Devens, MA. Ft Devens houses no major headquarters or activities which will be involved in the management of the build down over the next few years. Additionally, there are no unique requirements or missions which must be located in the geographic area other than facilities to support the current reserve component population. Ft Devens should be considered as a candidate for realignment or closure.

Ft Gillem and Ft McPherson, GA. These posts were considered as a complex during this phase of the analysis because of the symbiotic relationship they possess, i.e. functions of the same activities are split between these posts. Ft McPherson is the home of FORSCOM, a Major Command (MACOM) headquarters. The majority of the reductions in the Army end-strength in CONUS will come from tactical and supporting units assigned to FORSCOM and this headquarters will have to manage this reduction and restructuring. Because of this immense management task it would be imprudent to relocate HQ, FORSCOM and its attendant support during the build-down process. Because HQ, FORSCOM cannot be relocated during this time period, the Gillem-McPherson complex was excluded from further consideration for realignment or closure.

Ft Hamilton and Ft Totten, NY. Like Fts Gillem and McPherson, Fts Hamilton and Totten were considered as a complex. Neither of these posts will be involved in the management of the build-down of the Army and as such they are not critical to mid-term transition management operations at the Army level. However, the mission of this complex is exclusively area oriented and is not anticipated to be eliminated. The Army will still be required to support the current missions for the foreseeable future and the infrastructure in place at this complex is designed specifically for the current missions. If an agreement could be reached between the Army and the Navy over the geographic support to all DoD operations within the New York City area, consolidations between Army and Navy installations and

operations could occur and the complex could conceivably be closed. In the absence of such an agreement, it would not be prudent to close or realign either installation in the complex at this time. Therefore, the Hamilton-Totten complex was excluded from further consideration for realignment or closure.

FT Monroe, VA. Like Ft McPherson, Ft Monroe is home to a Major Command headquarters, TRADOC. This MACOM is also deeply involved in the build-down of the force. Its primary responsibility is the restructuring of the training system in synchronization with the restructuring of the fighting and supporting force. Because of the task of restructuring and down-sizing the training system, it would be imprudent to relocate HQ, TRADOC at this time. Like Ft McPherson and HQ, FORSCOM, if HQ, TRADOC remains in place, Ft Monroe should remain open. Because HQ, TRADOC cannot be relocated during this time period, Ft Monroe was excluded from further consideration for realignment or closure.

Summary. After completing the test for reasonability only one candidate was left to pass on to the feasibility phase, Ft Devens. The reasonability screening documented above applies only to the force and initiatives known or now under way. In the future, analyses required under the provisions of the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 should consider all command and control installations on equal basis and again apply test of reasonability to determine if potential to realign or close exists given the force structure and command, control and management philosophy of the day.

Determining Feasible Candidates.

Background. Currently, Ft Devens is scheduled to remain open and receive HQ, ISC as directed by the 1988 Base Closure and Realignment Commission. A major assumption used by the Commission during its analysis was that the force structure would not change appreciably during the foreseeable future. This assumed that the Army's end-strength would remain around 760,000. Hence, from the commission's perspective, if the Army remained about the same size Ft Devens would be needed to house some portion of the force, more specifically HQ, ISC. However, since the Commission's recommendations were published there has been a significant change in the Army's anticipated end-strength, from the 760,000 assumed by the commission to 535,000 currently envisioned by the end of FY 96.

This reduction in the end-strength has caused the Army in general and HQ, ISC in particular to re-evaluate how it organizes to support the force. Because of this

re-evaluation it is no longer operationally feasible to relocate HQ, ISC to Ft Devens. The command must reduce its size significantly and consolidate where it makes operational sense to do so. In order to accommodate its new manpower limits and provide the same types of services to the force, ISC is reorganizing and consolidating many of its functions.

This reorganization will see the headquarters significantly downsized while assuming the day-to-day management of many information mission area operations within CONUS. In order to support the reduction in manpower the 7th Signal Command, located at Ft Ritchie, MD, will be inactivated and its missions and some of its manpower transferred to HQ, ISC. ISC will also reorganize its support to installations within CONUS by forming regional brigades responsible for the management of information mission area support on a geographic basis. Previously, the focus had been on management at the installation level. In this new arrangement, selected assets will be consolidated from the installation level into the area support brigade in order to reduce overhead expenses.

Given the requirement to consolidate operations and functions and become more efficient with fewer resources, it becomes imperative that ISC capitalize on the experience of its workforce. To this end, consolidation at a location with a trained workforce in place is essential.

Ft Devens is also the home of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). This unit has special training needs as a result of their geographic mission orientation and mission requirements. To date, the Group has been able to meet its training requirements by deploying to training sites other than Ft Devens. However, with the impending down-sizing of the Army it has become evident that there is available capacity at installations which can better support the training requirements of the Group. Relocation of the Group should be examined to ensure the Army capitalizes on the training capacity and facilities which will best support the Group in the future.

The Reserve Components (RC) in Massachusetts and the northeast rely heavily on Ft Devens as a training and equipment concentration site. Because this requirement to support the RC will remain for the foreseeable future, an analysis of the feasibility of closing or realigning Ft Devens should consider the retention of an enclave of facilities and training area to support the RC.

Options. Given the preceding discussion, four options were considered in analyzing the feasibility of closing or realigning Ft Devens:

a. Status Quo, realign HQ, ISC from Ft Huachuca to Ft Devens and keep the post open.

b. Retain HQ, ISC functions at Ft Huachuca; retain ISC assets at Ft Momouth; relocate ISC assets from Ft Belvoir to Ft Ritchie; relocate 10th Special Forces Group to Ft Carson; relocate the Intelligence School, Devens to Ft Huachuca as recommended in BRAC I; relocate other units as necessary and transfer Ft Devens to the Reserve Components for use as a regional training center.

c. Relocate HQ, ISC and supporting elements to Ft Detrick, MD and Ft Ritchie, MD; relocate 10th Special Forces Group to Ft Carson; relocate the Intelligence School, Devens to Ft Huachuca as recommended in BRAC I; relocate other units as necessary and transfer Ft Devens to the Reserve Components for use as a regional training center .

d. A fourth option affecting Ft Devens was analyzed within the schools category. This option analyzed the consolidation of the Intelligence School and Signal School at Ft Devens but was rejected for operational reasons not discussed in this analysis.

Option A, Status Quo. This option was directed by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission of 1988 in order to consolidate ISC functions from across the country in one location. It also directed the relocation of the Intelligence School, Devens to Ft Huachuca. This option will not support ISC's operational concept for the future.

| | |
|-------------------------|-----------|
| COST TO EXECUTE: | |
| CONSTRUCTION | \$ 71.4M |
| OTHER COSTS | \$ 138.1M |
| TOTAL | \$ 209.5M |

RECURRING SAVINGS: \$9-11M per year

NOTES: These are the costs currently programmed against the Base Closure Account for execution of the 1988 Commission's recommendations. These costs are only for the consolidation of ISC. The savings displayed are primarily a result of the consolidation of the Intelligence School assets at Ft Huachuca. They are derived from the elimination of overhead maintained because of the dual staffing of the Intelligence School between Fts Huachuca and Devens.

Option B, Retain HQ, ISC at Ft Huachuca. This option capitalizes on the experience and infrastructure located at Ft Huachuca. It also requires the formation of a activity to assume the operations of 7th Signal Command at FT Ritchie and capitalizes on the experience of the workforce in place. This option is operationally and fiscally executable.

| | |
|------------------|---------|
| COST TO EXECUTE: | |
| CONSTRUCTION | \$ 80M |
| OTHER COSTS | \$ 46M |
| TOTAL | \$ 126M |

RECURRING SAVINGS: Approx \$55M per year

NOTE: This option includes the cost of relocating the 10th SFG and other units at Ft Devens.

Option C, relocate HQ, ISC and supporting elements to Ft Detrick and Ft Ritchie. This option could capitalize on the inactivation of the 7th Signal Command by allowing ISC to use these trained individuals in the formation of an operational cell designed to manage the day-today information management area functions assumed by the headquarters with the inactivation. HQ, ISC would relocate to Ft Detrick and HQ, Information Systems Engineering Command (ISEC) and supporting elements would fall in on Ft Ritchie. This option supports the command's operational concept for supporting the Army in the future. This option is operationally feasible but much more expensive in up-front cost.

| | |
|------------------|---------|
| COST TO EXECUTE: | |
| CONSTRUCTION | \$ 139M |
| OTHER COSTS | \$ 77M |
| TOTAL | \$ 216M |

RECURRING SAVINGS: Approx \$61M per year

NOTE: This option includes the cost of relocating the 10th SFG and other units at Ft Devens.

SECTION 3. APPLICATION OF FINAL CRITERIA

Military Value Analysis Description. The DOD selection criteria state that the Services should give "priority consideration" to military value, as defined by the first four criteria, when selecting an installation for realignment or closure. The Army dedicated the first phase of its study to the determination of the military value of its installations, using the five measures of merit. The crosswalk between measures of merit and the final criteria is discussed earlier in this report.

The military value analysis was quantitative in nature and focused on identifying and measuring specific, discrete attributes for each installation. When these attributes are taken as a whole they can reasonably be construed as portraying the military value or utility of an installation, when compared to like installations. This military value analysis was Phase I of the Army's Command and Control analysis.

The analytical process resulted in a relative military value array. It depicts the relative military value of installations within a category. The array was produced using a model which evaluated specific, measurable attributes across the installation in a category by assigning weights to the attributes based on their importance in measuring the utility of the type of installation. The value for each attribute for a given installation was compared against like attributes for the others in the category. This comparison allowed them to be scaled relative to one another, thereby producing a "best" to "worst" rating or value for each attribute. These values were then weighted based on a set of weighting criteria established for each category. The weighted attribute values were added and divided by the total weight assigned producing a rating for each post. The ratings were then used to produce the military value array.

A description of the model and the weighting rationale for the attributes used to evaluate this category is provided below. Data included in this analysis were the best available at the time the analysis was completed.

Following the weighting rationale is the final military value array for this category. The spreadsheet includes the attributes, weights, and actual values for each installation. Scores based upon the attribute values and weights are translated by the model to a relative ranking within the category, which is displayed on the last line of the array.

Model Description. As stated earlier, the purpose of the first phase of the base structure evaluation was to determine the military value of an installation relative to other installations which have historically performed the same types of missions and in turn determine the military value of an installation as it relates to the entire Army. This phase of analysis provided a comparative analysis of active duty command and control installations. Each installation within this category is comparatively measured against a set of uniform attributes. The attributes selected for use in the evaluation are relevant to the category's mission and provide a comprehensive overview and relative comparison of the installations' military utility and capability to meet the needs of the Army now and in the future. These installations are judged based on their relative overall value as a command and control installations rather than measuring them against their current mission needs or excess/under-utilized capacity.

During Phase I the Army chose to use a software package called Decision Pad (D-Pad) developed by Apian Software, Inc of Menlo Park, California to support its base structure evaluation, i.e., the assessment of the military utility of its installations.

The Model. D-Pad is a software package which is designed to assist a decision maker in reaching logical and consistent decisions by providing a mechanism to "weight" the various considerations or data elements a decision maker must consider when making a decision. This software allows a decision maker to evaluate a set of alternatives or courses of action by weighting a given set of criteria. Each criteria measures some aspect or consideration which must be addressed when evaluating the courses of action. The relative importance of each criteria to the whole decision is reflected in the weighting applied to it by decisionmakers during the modelling process. This provides the decision maker with a tool that allows him or her to place the emphasis their professional judgement dictates on each aspect of a decision, consistently, for each alternative or course of action considered.

For the Army's purpose, installations are viewed as the alternatives we are evaluating and the attributes are the criteria which are used to measure or assess each alternative. D-Pad allowed the Army to measure each installation using a set of measures common to each category and rank these installations in terms of their generic utility to the Army (i.e. their value in supporting our ability to generate, command, and control, forces and formations in support of the national strategy), not exclusively on their ability to support the current missions.

In this application, D-Pad is used to rank installations based on their utility, measured in largely quantitative terms rather than make decision on which installations to close or realign.

This primarily quantitative assessment of our installations provides a starting point in our evaluation of the Army's future installation structure. When we combine this assessment with the Army's force structure plan, basing strategy, and evolving management philosophy, as dictated by the Defense Management Review and other initiatives, we have all the components necessary to make stationing decisions which then dictate our base structure requirements.

The data used were primarily from Army standard management systems, reports, and installation data bases. Emphasis was placed on the collection of accurate, verifiable, consistent data which truly reflects the relative standing of each installation in relation to others within its category.

The intent of the model was to provide a relative, objective ranking of command and control installations. These comparative rankings established by the model pass the "common sense" test and provide a point of departure from which a detailed analysis of the realignment and closure potential of the installation can begin. This ranking does not provide a "close this installation first" listing. There are several installation unique considerations which cannot be captured through the use of standard, uniform criteria. The installation unique capabilities and functions must be considered before any decision to close or realign an installation is made. These unique capabilities and requirements were addressed during the capacity analysis.

Weighting Rationale. Each attribute used in this evaluation was assigned a weight that was uniformly applied to all installations across the category. The weights reflect the relative importance of that attribute in measuring the composite, overall military value of an installation. Sensitivity analyses of the weightings were conducted and revealed that the final rankings are relatively insensitive to changes in the weightings. Changes in the rankings do occur if the weights are changed but they are generally confined to movements of 1 place up or down.

Weights were initially set at an arbitrary value of 1000 divided between five Measure of Merit groupings: Mission Essentiality, Mission Suitability, Quality of Life, Operational Efficiencies, and Expandability. Upon further review of the initial attribute set, two were deemed unusable across the category and were dropped, along with the point values assigned.

This adjustment produced a final weighting total of 960 points distributed as follows:

| | |
|--------------------------|------------|
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY | 250 |
| MISSION SUITABILITY | 250 |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | 200 |
| OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCIES | 110 |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | <u>150</u> |
| TOTAL VALUE | 960 |

The attributes were developed in conjunction with the MACOM staffs and HQDA functional experts in order to determine the best available measures of military utility of the installations within the category. These attributes are measurable items which can be reasonably associated with a given measure of merit and are a reasonable reflection of what constitutes the military utility of this category of installations. The attributes listed under Mission Essentiality and Mission Suitability are specific to this category. Other measures are generally common across all categories of installations.

For this category weights for each attribute were determined by polling the MACOM staffs and selected functional experts within HQDA, to include General Officers and Senior Executive Service managers. The polling was done using a blind, that is, the individuals polled were asked only how important they thought each attribute was in establishing the military utility of command and control installations. Those polled never saw the raw data corresponding to a measure of each attribute for the posts in the category. These weightings reflect the professional judgement and experience of those polled and are considered to be an excellent measuring stick of what makes a post a good command and control installation.

C & C MODEL DATA

| | | FT BELVOIR | FT DEVENS | FT GILLEM | FT HAMILTON |
|----------------------|--------|--------------|------------|-----------|-------------|
| | WEIGHT | | | | |
| MACOM | ... | MDW | FORSKOM | FORSKOM | TRADOC |
| MAJOR UNIT SUPPORT | 60 | 18.0-- | 7.0 | 0.0-- | 1.0- |
| LEVELS OF COMMAND | 71 | 53.0-- | 8.0 | 14.0 | 0.0-- |
| RESERVE SUPPORT | 39 | 0.4- | 5.9-- | 0.1- | 1.1 |
| AR 5-9 SUPPORT | 36 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| PROXIMITY | 44 | 16.0-- | 2.0- | 3.0- | 1.0- |
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY | — 250 | 7.1 | 3.0 | 1.1 | 0.5 |
| | | | | | |
| ACCESSIBILITY | 41 | 20.00+ | 1330.00-- | 540.00 | 48.75+ |
| RECRUIT & RETAIN | 36 | 98.0% | 97.3% | 98.0% | 77.0% |
| TOTAL OP/ADMIN FACS | 35 | 588973.0 | 422000.0 | 736000.0 | 118105.0- |
| PERM OP/ADMIN FACS | 50 | 408991.0 | 242.0-- | 567000.0+ | 118105.0- |
| TRANSPORTATION NET | 48 | 3.000 | 2.000-- | 4.000+ | 3.000 |
| IHA INFRASTRUCTURE | 40 | 1570.0-- | 315.0- | 435.0 | 0.0-- |
| MSN SUITABILITY | — 250 | 7.4 | 2.8 | 6.8 | 4.3 |
| | | | | | |
| VHA | 15 | \$497 | \$537 | \$210 | \$477 |
| AFH PER UNIT | 15 | \$5,964 | \$5,168 | \$23,053- | \$5,700 |
| AVG CIV SALARY | 14 | \$31,640 | \$29,028 | \$29,348 | \$28,800 |
| AVG HOURLY WAGE RATE | 15 | \$12.97 | \$11.14 | \$12.57 | \$12.41 |
| UTILITY COST FACTOR | 17 | \$2,995- | \$985 | \$621 | \$1,115 |
| RPMA FACTOR | 18 | \$35,722- | \$3,371 | \$1,242 | \$2,030 |
| MILCON FACTOR | 16 | 1.05 | 1.28 | 0.83 | 1.25 |
| OPERAT. EFFICIENCIES | — 110 | 3.4 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 6.0 |
| | | | | | |
| PERCENT PERM FACS | 31 | 96.8% | 76.0% | 71.0% | 100.0% |
| ACOE SCORE | 22 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| AFH UNITS | 29 | 22143.0 | 2189.0 | 4935.0 | 968.0 |
| UPH OFFICER | 22 | 454.0+ | 97.0 | 167.0 | 57.0 |
| UPH ENLISTED | 24 | 2133.0 | 1908.0 | 12.0 | 526.0 |
| COMMUNITY FACS | 24 | 809763.0+ | 567000.0 | 369000.0 | 128806.0- |
| PLACES RATED | 23 | 4.0 | 288.0-- | 11.0 | 7.0 |
| HEALTH CARE SUPPORT | 25 | 15.0+ | 6.0+ | 65.0- | 54.0- |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | — 200 | 6.9 | 4.0 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| | | | | | |
| TOTAL BUILDABLE ACRE | 33 | 700.0-- | 616.0+ | 150.0 | 3.0- |
| TOTAL BUILDING SQ FT | 31 | 10760169.0-- | 7352000.0+ | 6542000.0 | 1092067.0- |
| ENCROACHMENT | 26 | 1992.0 | 704.0 | 456.0 | 33061.0-- |
| ENVIRONMENT | 26 | 3.7-- | 9.5 | 10.0 | 9.9 |
| WATER AND SEWER | 34 | 6.1 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 10.0+ |
| EXPANDABILITY | — 150 | 7.1 | 7.6 | 6.2 | 4.1 |
| | | | | | |
| SCORE | — 960 | 6.7 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 3.3 |
| RANK | | 1 | 9 | 6 | 11 |

C & C MODEL DATA

| | | FT MCPHERSON | FT MEADE | FT MONROE | FT MYER |
|----------------------|--------|--------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|
| | WEIGHT | | | | |
| MACOM | ... | FORSCOM | FORSCOM | TRADOC | NDW |
| MAJOR UNIT SUPPORT | 60 | 4.0 | 10.0+ | 2.0- | 2.0- |
| LEVELS OF COMMAND | 71 | 12.0 | 14.0 | 13.0 | 0.0-- |
| RESERVE SUPPORT | 39 | 0.1- | 6.0++ | 0.0- | 0.0- |
| AR 5-9 SUPPORT | 36 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| PROXIMITY | 44 | 3.0- | 9.0 | 16.0++ | 13.0++ |
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY | — 250 | 1.6 | 4.7 | 2.7 | 1.7 |
| | | | | | |
| ACCESSIBILITY | 41 | 950.00-- | 383.00 | 286.00 | 6.75+ |
| RECRUIT & RETAIN | 36 | 98.0% | 95.1% | 96.0% | 97.0% |
| TOTAL OP/ADMIN FACS | 35 | 967000.0+ | 1140000.0++ | 525893.0 | 157227.0- |
| PERM OP/ADMIN FACS | 50 | 943000.0++ | 689.0-- | 470758.0 | 157227.0- |
| TRANSPORTATION NET | 48 | 4.000+ | 4.000+ | 3.000 | 4.000+ |
| IMA INFRASTRUCTURE | 40 | 1255.0+ | 440.0 | 1075.0+ | 120.0- |
| MSN SUITABILITY | — 250 | 8.3 | 6.3 | 6.6 | 5.5 |
| | | | | | |
| VHA | 15 | \$210 | \$379 | \$193 | \$497 |
| AFH PER UNIT | 15 | \$18,654 | \$4,596 | \$2,502 | \$14,403 |
| AVG CIV SALARY | 14 | \$29,348 | \$28,274 | \$27,868 | \$23,225 |
| AVG HOURLY WAGE RATE | 15 | \$12.57 | \$11.72 | \$10.15 | \$12.97 |
| UTILITY COST FACTOR | 17 | \$345 | \$535 | \$591 | \$185 |
| RPMA FACTOR | 18 | \$6,806 | \$3,226 | \$1,924 | \$6,372 |
| MILCON FACTOR | 16 | 0.83 | 1.05 | 0.92 | 1.05 |
| OPERAT. EFFICIENCIES | — 110 | 6.9 | 7.3 | 8.5 | 6.7 |
| | | | | | |
| PERCENT PERM FACS | 31 | 93.0% | 75.0% | 91.0% | 100.0% |
| ACOE SCORE | 22 | 2.000 | 0.000 | 2.000 | 2.000 |
| AFH UNITS | 29 | 4935.0 | 96944.0++ | 1007.0 | 1950.0 |
| UPH OFFICER | 22 | 418.0+ | 202.0 | 0.0- | 91.0 |
| UPH ENLISTED | 24 | 41.0 | 4414.0++ | 333.0 | 2517.0 |
| COMMUNITY FACS | 24 | 322000.0 | 644000.0+ | 247462.0 | 399016.0 |
| PLACES RATED | 23 | 11.0 | 17.0 | 33.0 | 4.0 |
| HEALTH CARE SUPPORT | 25 | 65.0- | 7.0+ | 51.0 | 4.0+ |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | — 200 | 4.2 | 7.5 | 3.3 | 5.5 |
| | | | | | |
| TOTAL BUILDABLE ACRE | 33 | 100.0- | 750.0++ | 125.0- | 11.6- |
| TOTAL BUILDING SQ FT | 31 | 2081000.0 | 9377000.0+ | 2038570.0 | 2150602.0 |
| ENCROACHMENT | 26 | 456.0 | 618.0 | 2007.0 | 9124.0 |
| ENVIRONMENT | 26 | 9.2 | 9.6 | 5.0- | 8.4 |
| WATER AND SEWER | 34 | 5.0 | 5.5 | 0.5-- | 5.6 |
| EXPANDABILITY | — 150 | 4.9 | 8.5 | 2.7 | 4.2 |
| | | | | | |
| SCORE | 960 | 5.0 | 6.6 | 4.5 | 4.4 |
| | | | | | |
| RANK | | 5 | 2 | 6 | 8 |

C & C MODEL DATA

| MACOM | WEIGHT | FT RITCHIE | FT SHAFTER | FT TOTTEN |
|----------------------|--------|------------|------------|-----------|
| | | ISC | USARPAC | TRADOC |
| MAJOR UNIT SUPPORT | 60 | 20.0→ | 4.0 | 1.0- |
| LEVELS OF COMMAND | 71 | 19.0+ | 3.0- | 2.0- |
| RESERVE SUPPORT | 39 | 0.3- | 2.7 | 3.2+ |
| AR 5-9 SUPPORT | 36 | 1.0 | 28.0→ | 0.0 |
| PROXIMITY | 44 | 5.0 | 1.0- | 1.0- |
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY | — 250 | 4.1 | 2.9 | 1.2 |
| | | | | |
| ACCESSIBILITY | 41 | 758.00- | 11.00+ | 58.75+ |
| RECRUIT & RETAIN | 36 | 100.0% | 99.4% | 86.0% |
| TOTAL OP/ADMIN FACS | 35 | 903000.0+ | 639474.0 | 108154.0- |
| PERM OP/ADMIN FACS | 50 | 892000.0→ | 411181.0 | 108154.0- |
| TRANSPORTATION NET | 48 | 3.000 | 4.000+ | 4.000+ |
| IMA INFRASTRUCTURE | 40 | 1340.0→ | 1175.0+ | 0.0-- |
| MSN SUITABILITY | — 250 | 7.8 | 7.8 | 5.0 |
| | | | | |
| VHA | 15 | \$172 | \$624 | \$477 |
| AFH PER UNIT | 15 | \$7,475 | \$4,152 | \$6,400 |
| AVG CIV SALARY | 14 | \$30,945 | \$34,777 | \$28,800 |
| AVG HOURLY WAGE RATE | 15 | \$16.04 | \$16.37- | \$12.41 |
| UTILITY COST FACTOR | 17 | \$1,057 | \$420 | \$1,115 |
| RPMA FACTOR | 18 | \$2,371 | \$1,473 | \$2,029 |
| MILCON FACTOR | 16 | 0.94 | .137- | 1.25 |
| OPERAT. EFFICIENCIES | — 110 | 6.4 | 4.4 | 5.9 |
| | | | | |
| PERCENT PERM FACS | 31 | 86.5% | 62.0%- | 100.0% |
| ACOE SCORE | 22 | 4.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| AFH UNITS | 29 | 2385.0 | 669.0 | 968.0 |
| UPH OFFICER | 22 | 124.0 | 360.0+ | 0.0- |
| UPH ENLISTED | 24 | 1309.0 | 519.0 | 0.0 |
| COMMUNITY FACS | 24 | 234804.0 | 364091.0 | 44668.0- |
| PLACES RATED | 23 | 261.0-- | 32.0 | 7.0 |
| HEALTH CARE SUPPORT | 25 | 56.0- | 4.0+ | 54.0- |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | — 200 | 3.0 | 4.8 | 2.9 |
| | | | | |
| TOTAL BUILDABLE ACRE | 33 | 272.0 | 549.0+ | 0.0- |
| TOTAL BUILDING SQ FT | 31 | 2197239.0 | 2666839.0 | 405840.0- |
| ENCROACHMENT | 26 | 173.1 | 4294.0 | 17661.0- |
| ENVIRONMENT | 26 | 10.0 | 9.7 | 9.8 |
| WATER AND SEWER | 34 | 5.6 | 4.9 | 9.1+ |
| EXPANDABILITY | — 150 | 5.8 | 6.3 | 4.5 |
| | | | | |
| SCORE | — 960 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 3.6 |
| | | | | |
| RANK | | 3 | 4 | 10 |

SECTION 4.

ROLE EACH CRITERIA PLAYED IN THE DECISION PROCESS

Clearly, the most important factor in the analysis of the Command and Control installations was the idea of military value (Criteria one through four). In Phase I of the analysis, all installations within the category were evaluated based on their physical attributes and their potential to accept and support additional missions. The military value array provided a comparative analysis of the tangible assets and capabilities provided by each installation within the category. The military value array displayed the command and control installations in four groupings:

| <u>Group 1</u> | <u>Group 2</u> | <u>Group 3</u> | <u>Group 4</u> |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Belvoir | Ritchie | Gillem | Totten |
| Meade | Shafter | Monroe | Hamilton |
| | McPherson | Myer | |
| | | Devens | |

These groupings represented the relative assessment of military utility within the category, with Group One having the most utility or potential for the Army and Group Four having the least. This analysis did not take into account special missions, considerations, or capabilities of a post but did provide a baseline for comparison, all mission related considerations being equal, which would allow the Army to develop realignment and closure scenarios.

The focus of Phase I was on Criteria One, Two and Three; ability to accommodate current and future missions, the availability of land and facilities, and the ability to accommodate contingencies and mobilizations. It was from this baseline that the Phase II analysis was initiated.

Phase II focused on defining the specific mission implications of a proposed closure or realignment in terms of its reasonability and feasibility. As stated earlier, the intent was to determine what installations the Army could reasonably afford to realign or close and whether or not it was feasible in terms of cost, financial, environmental, and social, to do so. Specifically, Phase II embodied Criteria One, Four, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight.

Criterion One, operational readiness, was addressed during the Strategic/Long-term and Operational/Mid-term analyses. The intent was to ensure that closure and realignment actions would not seriously degrade our mid-term

operational abilities or our long-term/strategic capabilities and plans. The focus was on ensuring the operational readiness of the force was not adversely impacted. During this analysis ten of the eleven posts within the category were eliminated from consideration for the reasons stated in section 2, Capacity Analysis (Screening of Installations).

Criteria Four and Five; the cost and manpower implications and extent and timing of cost of savings, were addressed in the COBRA cost estimating model. This model supported all cost-savings analysis and provided data and analyses on the impacts of closure and realignments. This analysis was used to determine the feasibility of executing a realignment or closure scenario. All costs and savings estimates were closely scrutinized and it was determined that the closure of Ft Devens is a solid management decision for the Army.

Criteria Six, Seven and Eight; economic impact, community support, and the environment, were all addressed in Phase II. The potential impacts to the communities involved in these decisions was thoroughly discussed. In sum, it was determined that there were no over-riding economic or environmental reasons to discount any of the postulated realignment or closure scenarios. As such, these considerations were not determining factors in the decision to recommend the closure of Ft Devens. Any community involved in a realignment or closure can be adversely affected but with proper planning and assistance history has shown the community will recover. Additionally, the potential of Ft Devens to serve as a regional airport to support the Boston air corridor was considered a plus in the potential reuse of the post.

SECTION 5. RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPACTS

RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Close Ft Devens.

a. Retain sufficient facilities to house and support remaining reserve component activities within a small reserve enclave on Ft Devens proper.

b. Relocate selected reserve component units as necessary.

c. Retain approximately 3000 acres of training area, ranges and impact area located on the south-west portion of post, bounded roughly by State Route 2, Lunenberg Road and Trainfire Road, for use by the reserve components.

d. Dispose of all property and land not included in the reserve enclave and the retained training area.

2. Cancel the relocation of HQ, ISC and subordinate elements to Ft Devens, MA as directed under Public Law 100-526. Continue the relocation of the Intelligence School, Devens to Ft Huachuca as directed under Public Law 100-526.]

3. Relocate the 10th SFG (ABN) to Ft Carson, CO.

4. Retain HQ, Information Systems Command, HQ, Information Systems Engineering Command, and supporting elements at Ft Huachuca, AZ.]

5. Retain ISC elements (Information Systems Management Activity) at Ft Monmouth.

6. Relocate ISC elements (Information Systems Engineering Command activities and Information Systems Software Center elements) from Ft Belvoir, VA within the NCR or to Ft Ritchie, MD.

7. Relocate remaining units and activities throughout the installation structure at the discretion of the owning MACOM Commanders.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS.

Environmental Impact Summary, Fort Devens, MA.

If selected for closure action by the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, the following are considered the

"environmental consequences" at Fort Devens:

Pollution Control: **Eliminated.** Closure of Ft Devens will eliminate air emissions emanating from minor sources.

Programmed "environmental costs": **Caution.** Closure of this installation is not expected to eliminate the need for expenditure of funds for pollution abatement programs.

Cultural Resources: **Caution.** There are no sites on Ft Devens listed in the National or State Register of Historic Places. Based on a 1987 NEPA document prepared as part of the Master Plan for Ft Devens, a number of buildings were being considered as eligible for National Register Status.

Contaminated Sites/ Hazardous Materials/ Wastes: **Caution.** Ft Devens was placed on the EPA's National Priorities List in 1989. Numerous sites are in need of restoration, investigations (Remedial Investigation/ Feasibility Study and Resource Conservation Recovery Act closure) have begun at several of the sites. Due to the age of most of the buildings at Ft Devens it can be assumed that asbestos containing materials are present at the installation.

Threatened and Endangered Species: **No Impact.** No Federal or State listed threatened or endangered plant or animal species have been reported at Ft Devens.

Land and Air Use/Wetlands: **Caution.** 4574 acres (approximately 40% of Ft Devens) of the South Post portion of Ft Devens has been designated as training areas, firing ranges, and drop zones. Restrictions on future land use at Ft Devens may be required due to the presence of Unexploded Ordnance and contamination in the impact zones and because of the number of areas that will need to be remediated prior to excessing. Surrounding land use at Ft Devens is largely rural and residential. Approximately 600 acres of wetlands are located within Ft Devens's boundaries.

Environmental Impact Summary, Fort Carson, Co.

If selected for realignment action by the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, the following are considered the "environmental consequences" at Fort Carson:

Pollution Control: **Minimal.** Realignment should not impact ongoing pollution control measures.

Programmed "environmental costs": **No Impact.** Realignment should not have any impact on scheduled or ongoing environmental programs.

Cultural Resources: Minimal. Realignment should not impact the petroglyphs found on the canyon walls along Turkey Creek and other sites of historic significance located on Fort Carson.

Contaminated Sites/Hazardous Materials/Wastes: Minimal. Depending on the activities to be performed as a result of realignment, sites such as impact areas may be affected (increased amounts of unexploded ordnance in the area). Increased use of petroleum, oil, and lubricants and their disposal may also be concern.

Threatened and Endangered Species: No Impact. Threatened and endangered species stocked in Lytle Reservoir should not be impacted by realignment.

Land and Air Uses/Wetlands: No Impact. There should not be any impacts to land and air uses due to realignment. Realigned activities would have to avoid flood plain areas as appropriate.

Environmental Impact Summary, Fort Huachuca, AZ.

If selected for realignment action by the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, the following are considered the "environmental consequences" at Ft Huachuca, AZ:

Pollution Control: Minimal. Realignment to Fort Huachuca will have minimal effect on any air pollution emissions emanating from various sources.

Programmed "environmental costs": Caution. Realignment to Fort Huachuca will not eliminate the need for expenditure of funds for environmental investigations. A sampling and analysis program should be conducted to determine the extent of any soil contamination at the landfill, former Fire-Fighter Training Area, the POL Storage Facility-Libby AAF, Military POL Filling Station, and the PX Service Station.

Cultural Resources: Caution. There are several areas and buildings at Fort Huachuca on or potentially eligible for the National Register.

Contaminated Sites/ Hazardous Materials/Wastes: Caution. The Installation Assessment of Fort Huachuca (1980), identified 24 locations of known or suspected waste materials. Most of these areas including 10 former landfills have never been sampled for contaminants. An update of this assessment was conducted in 1988 and found additional areas which may have released contaminants to the soil. As part of this report the U.S. EPA's Environmental Photographic Center (EPIC) performed a study in which it attempted to identify

potential contamination areas using aerial photographs. Ten areas were added to the report as a result of the EPIC study.

Threatened and Endangered Species: Caution. Numerous threatened, endangered, and candidate sensitive wildlife species are known to occur at Fort Huachuca. These include raptors such as gray hawks and common black hawks as well as the recently listed endangered species Sanborn's long-nosed bat. The post is currently in the first stages of development of a management plan for the species. The plan will involve protection of roosting sites, preservation of large areas containing agaves and minimization of electronic and other activities potentially affecting the species. Much of these areas are currently not used intensively for military training activities.

Land and Air Uses/Wetlands: Minimal.

Land: Much of the surrounding land is leased for grazing and agricultural uses. Range areas which contain unexploded ordnance will need surface sweeping and clearing prior to property release for similar use.

Air Uses: The nature of the proposed relocation to Fort Huachuca should not significantly impact existing noise contours.

Wetlands: Information on wetlands was not available however due to the arid desert climate, the presence of wetlands should be minimal.

Environmental Impact Summary, Fort Ritchie, MD.

If selected for realignment action by the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, the following are considered the "environmental consequences" at Fort Ritchie.

Pollution Control: Minimal. Ft Ritchie has several stationary sources of air emissions which are in need of registration with the State of Maryland. These sources include boilers and generators. Increases in activity at Ft Ritchie will demand closer scrutiny of these emissions to regulatory controls.

Programmed "environmental costs": Increase. Staffing levels in the environmental office are inadequate to meet current needs, an increase in Ft Ritchie's mission will accentuate the need to adequately staff this office.

Cultural Resources: Minimal. Information was not available in the reports reviewed.

Contaminated Sites/Hazardous Materials/Wastes:

Increase. Due to the small amount of hazardous waste generated at Ft Ritchie the installation has been exempt from the need to obtain a permitted conforming hazardous waste storage facility. An increase in the mission of this installation may push expand the generation of hazardous waste and may require that the installation obtain the proper permits and fund the construction of a hazardous waste storage building.

Threatened and Endangered Species: Minimal.

Information not available in the reports reviewed.

Land and Air Uses/Wetlands: Minimal.

Ft Ritchie is located in a rural area of north central Maryland. There are not wetlands on the property. The installation does not maintain an airfield and no information was available concerning surrounding land uses or zoning classifications.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS.

The model used to assess the economic impact on the affected communities was developed under the auspices of the Office of Economic Adjustment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. The model reveals the following estimates of the economic impact, in terms of employment opportunities, on each of the affected communities:

| | |
|-----------------|-------|
| Ft Devens, MA | -3.5% |
| Ft Huachuca, AZ | +7.7% |
| Ft Carson, CO | +1.0% |
| Ft Ritchie, MD | +0.5% |
| Ft Monmouth | +0.3% |

RETURN ON INVESTMENT

The display on the following page depicts the COBRA cost model final output for the closing of Ft Devens, attendant relocations of units currently occupying the post, and other costs to execute.

Option NPV20 (\$K) : -409878
 Total One-Time Cost (\$K) : 121089
 Months to Break Even : 0
 Years : 0

Losing Base : FT DEVENS
 Group : FORSCOM
 Service : ARMY
 Option Package : DEVEN-A26

Strategy : 2
 (1-Transfer, 2-Close, 3-Deactivate)

Baseline Year : 1991

| | Net Cost (\$K) | | | Constant Dollars | | | |
|------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| | Year1 1992 | Year2 1993 | Year3 1994 | Year4 1995 | Year5 1996 | Year6 1997 | Beyond |
| Mission | 0 | 0 | 1716 | 5148 | 5720 | 5720 | 5720 |
| Personnel | 0 | 0 | -100 | -1665 | -1963 | -20579 | -41026 |
| Overhead | 506 | 379 | 336 | -1403 | -7782 | -12564 | -23134 |
| Construct | -33509 | -33800 | 19265 | 41331 | 6888 | 0 | 0 |
| Moving | 0 | 0 | 2429 | 5405 | 3574 | 3035 | 0 |
| Other | -34743 | -218 | -9111 | -4616 | 412 | -145135 | -1942 |
| NET | -67747 | -33639 | 14535 | 44201 | 6850 | -169523 | -60382 |

SECTION 6. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Ft Devens would be transferred to the Reserve Components by the end of FY 1997. The following implementation schedule is illustrative of the relocations and supporting actions necessary to accomplish the closure:

| | |
|---------|---|
| FY 1991 | Obtain approval to close from Commission and Congress Begin environmental documentation process and initial relocation planning Begin community planning assistance |
| FY 1992 | Continue environmental analysis and detailed execution planning Begin property disposal process |
| FY 1993 | Finalize environmental analysis and publish findings Begin construction |
| FY 1994 | Continue construction. Begin the initial movement of units and activities off Ft Devens |
| FY 1995 | Continue construction Main elements of many activities begin movement to new locations |
| FY 1996 | Continue construction as necessary Majority of activities and units are clear of post by year-end |
| FY 1997 | Those portions of not required for use in the reserve enclave and training area are cleared for disposal and Ft Devens is transferred to the Reserve Components |

BRAC 93

DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS

TAB D: PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS

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


1. DESCRIPTION OF CATEGORY

The Professional Schools have the mission of providing the Army with trained individual soldiers, developing the doctrine that describes how the Army will fight, defining the Army's material requirements, designing the Army's organizations and developing the Army's leaders. The training mission includes entry level and advanced training for enlisted soldiers and officers, career professional training for the NCO and officer corps, and training Department of the Army civilians.

The installations listed below were those evaluated within the Training - Professional School Category.

- Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
- Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
- Fort Leslie McNair, Washington, DC
- Presidio of Monterey, California
- United States Military Academy, West Point, New York

The map that follows shows the geographic distribution of Professional School installations.



PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS

2. MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

a. Description

The DoD selection criteria states that the Services should give "priority consideration" to military value, as defined by the first four criteria, when selecting an installation for realignment or closure. The Army determined the military value of its installations using the five DoD measures of merit. The crosswalk between measures of merit and the final criteria is discussed earlier in this report.

The military value analysis described here was quantitative in nature and focused on identifying and measuring specific, discrete attributes for each installation. When these attributes are taken as a whole they can reasonably be construed as portraying the military value or utility of an installation, when compared to like installations. In addition, narrative descriptions of each installation's military value, including non-quantitative considerations, were prepared to provide a more complete picture. Although these assessments are not included in this basic report, they are available as reference materials.

b. Evaluation Methodology

During Phase I the Army chose to use a software package called Decision Pad (D-Pad) developed by Apian Software, Inc of Menlo Park, California to support its base structure evaluation. This software allows the user to evaluate a set of similar installations by weighting a given set of criteria. Each criteria measures some aspect or consideration which contributes to the military value of the installation. The relative importance of each criteria to the evaluation is reflected in the weighting applied to it by the user during the modelling process.

For the Army's purpose, installations are viewed as the alternatives we are evaluating and the attributes are the criteria which are used to measure or assess each alternative. D-Pad allows the Army to measure each installation using a set of measures common to each category and ranks these installations in terms of their generic utility to the Army (i.e., their value in supporting our ability to generate, command, and control forces and formations in support of the national strategy) not exclusively on their ability to support the current missions. In this application, D-Pad is used to rank installations based on their utility, measured largely in quantitative terms rather than making decisions on which installations to close or realign.

The data used were primarily from Army standard management systems, reports, and installation data bases. Emphasis was placed on the collection of accurate, verifiable,

consistent data which truly reflects the relative standing of each installation in relation to others within its category.

The intent of the model was to provide a relative, objective ranking of all installations within this category. These comparative rankings established by the model pass the "common sense" test and provides a point of departure from which a detailed analysis of the realignment and closure potential of the installation can begin. This ranking does not provide a "close this installation first" listing. There are several installation unique capabilities and functions that must be considered before any decision to close or realign is made. These unique capabilities and functions were addressed during other phases of the study. Definition for each of the attributes listed below are available in a reference volume which serves as a companion to this basic report.

c. Measures of Merit, Attributes and Weights

Mission Essentiality. These attributes measure the ability of the installations to generate, project, and sustain combat power in support of national military goals. The five attributes are weighted as follows:

| <u>Attribute</u> | <u>Points</u> |
|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Mobilization | 30 |
| Army Readiness | 50 |
| General Instructional Facilities | 100 |
| Deployment Network | 30 |
| <u>Reserve Support</u> | <u>40</u> |
| Total | 250 |

The single most important attribute of the professional training installations is general instructional facilities, the classroom. This attribute measures the in-place capability of the installation to conduct training by considering general purpose training facilities available.

The remaining attributes Mobilization, Army Readiness, Deployment Network and Reserve Support also indicate the importance of mission essentiality. Army Readiness measures the installation's capacity to train, equip and deploy units in a time of national emergency. Deployment evaluates the capability of the installation to support deployment of either troops or material to distant locations, or support installations personnel with adequate transportation. Reserve Support provides a

relative measure of support provided to Reserve Component units and individuals during peacetime (training) and transition to war (mobilization).

Mission Suitability. These attributes provide an overall assessment of the ability of the installation to support the operational requirements of its assigned units. The seven attributes are weighted as follows:

| <u>Attribute</u> | <u>Points</u> |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|
| Applied Instructional Facilities | 70 |
| Maneuver Training Acres | 10 |
| Ranges | 10 |
| Maintenance Facilities | 20 |
| Operational/Administrative Facilities | 55 |
| Information Mission Area | 55 |
| <u>Construction Investment</u> | <u>30</u> |
| Total Points | 250 |

The most important aspect of mission suitability is the Applied Instructional Facilities. These facilities are special purpose facilities used for training and instruction and represent a significant cost investment to the military.

Operational/Administrative Facilities and the Information Mission Area (IMA) also carry significant weight within this category. Operational/Administrative Facilities provide the installation capacity for providing permanent general purpose administrative and operational facilities. Information Mission Area evaluates IMA systems on the basis of available capacity, capability for expansion and technology utilized.

Other attributes measuring Mission Suitability are: Maneuver Training Acres, Ranges, Maintenance Facilities, and Construction Investment. Maneuver Training Acres measure the overall land size of the installation available for maneuver. Ranges evaluate the range capacity. Maintenance Facilities are evaluated by availability of permanent facilities. They are critical to efficient and effective unit and installation operations and are a key factor in maintaining unit readiness and support to tenants and reserve components. Construction Investment is the overall investment in facilities and real property over the past 10 years and is an indicator of the installation's modernization.

Operational Efficiencies. These attributes provide an overall assessment of the relative cost involved in stationing the force and operating the installations. The six attributes are weighted as follows:

| <u>Attributes</u> | <u>Points</u> |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|
| Variable Housing Allowance | 15 |
| Family Housing Cost per Unit | 15 |
| Average Civilian Salary | 10 |
| Manpower Estimating Relationship | 20 |
| Cost Estimate Relationship | 20 |
| <u>Military Construction Cost</u> | <u>20</u> |
| Total | 100 |

There are no significant differences among the attributes. Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) provides an indicator of the location cost to the Army for assignment of military personnel to an installation. Family Housing Cost Per Unit measures the cost to maintain one set of family quarters at an installation. This attribute compliments the VHA attribute. Average Civilian Salary indicates the relative BASOPS cost for civilian workers at installations. BASOPS Manpower Estimating Relationship (MER) provides an indication of associated manpower costs for operating the installation (excludes mission operations). BASOPS Cost Estimate Relationship (CER) is an overall economic indicator concerning the long term BASOPS operational cost to retain an installation. The Military Construction Cost Factor indicates the relative difference between installations for construction of the same facility. It provides a relative cost of capital investment for modernization or expansion of facilities.

Expandability. Five attributes were developed to measure the ability of the installation to increase current mission activities and accept other functions at the same location.

| <u>Attribute</u> | <u>Points</u> |
|------------------------|---------------|
| Total Buildable Acres | 50 |
| Encroachment | 20 |
| Environmental Capacity | 50 |
| Multi-function | 30 |
| <u>Infrastructure</u> | <u>50</u> |
| Total | 200 |

The major emphasis in this category is placed on three attributes: Total Buildable Acres, Environmental Capacity, and Infrastructure. Total Buildable Acres measures the installation's capacity to support additional permanent structures. Environmental Capacity is a composite of various environmental factors and measures the ability of the installation to conduct its current mission, receive additional units and expand operations in light of environmental constraints. Infrastructure measures the capacity of water, sewage treatment, electrical distribution and land fill facilities available to the installation.

The other two attributes, Encroachment and Multi-function address expandability issues as well. Encroachment reviews the population density of the area surrounding the installation. The theory is that the lower the population density around the post, the easier it will be to expand mission activity without impacting the surrounding community. The Multi-function attribute addresses the installation's ability to support multiple functions now and in the future. It also indicates the magnitude of difficulty in relocating various elements on an installation.

Quality of Life. Eight attributes were developed to measure the ability of an installation to support soldiers and their families. They are weighted as follows:

| <u>Attribute</u> | <u>Points</u> |
|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Percent Permanent Facilities | 25 |
| TRADOC Communities of Excellence | 10 |
| Army Family Housing | 30 |
| Unaccompanied Officer Housing | 25 |
| Unaccompanied Enlisted Housing | 40 |
| Community Facilities | 30 |
| Places Rated Almanac Rating | 15 |
| <u>Health Care Support Index</u> | <u>25</u> |
| Total | 200 |

Unaccompanied Enlisted Housing, Unaccompanied Officer Housing and Army Family Housing are significant attributes because they measure the capability and availability of housing for the soldier and their families.

The remaining attributes measure the overall quality of the installation's facilities. The Percent Permanent Facilities indicate the overall quality of the installation's facilities. TRADOC's Community of Excellence indicates the installation's ability to provide a comparative living and working environment and quality of services at installations. Community facilities measure the installation's total available community facilities to include Non Appropriated Fund activities. The Health Care Support Index measures the effective use of health care dollars on a capitalization basis and Places Rated Almanac Rating measures the quality of life in the surrounding civilian community.

d. Summary

The military value spreadsheets for this category are provided below.

| | WEIGHT | Leavenworth | West Point | Presidio of Monterey |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|----------------------|
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY ... | | | | |
| Mob Billets (WT) | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Army Readiness | 50 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| General Instr Fac | 100 | 511,979 | 881,368 | 506,000 |
| Deployment (Trans) | 30 | 1.4 | 6.0 | 8.0 |
| RC/Area Support | 40 | 3.4 | 7.5 | 0.0 |
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY | 250 | 5.5 | 8.5 | 4.8 |
| MISSION SUITABILITY ... | | | | |
| Applied Instr Fac | 70 | 78,111 | 40,775 | 15,328 |
| Contiguous Maneuver Ranges | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Maintenance Fac | 20 | 140,606 | 225,095 | 45,000 |
| Operations/Admin | 55 | 652,976 | 825,464 | 303,451 |
| Info Msn Area Spt | 55 | 1,515 | 1,150 | 690 |
| Construct Invest | 30 | 76 | 0 | 87 |
| MISSION SUITABILITY | 250 | 8.6 | 6.8 | 3.7 |
| QUALITY OF LIFE ... | | | | |
| Percent Permanent | 25 | 98.6% | 100.0% | 92.5% |
| ARMY COE Score | 10 | 13 | 0 | 1 |
| Family Housing | 30 | 2,910 | 1,551 | 1,683 |
| Officer UPH | 25 | 860 | 4,037 | 440 |
| UEPH & Trainee | 40 | 428 | 1,317 | 2,052 |
| Community Fac (SF) | 30 | 689,855 | 1,604,153 | 581,912 |
| Places Rated Alacm | 15 | 41 | 213 | 140 |
| Health Care Spt In | 25 | 20 | 32 | 15 |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | 200 | 5.4 | 6.0 | 4.4 |
| OPERATION EFFICIENCY ... | | | | |
| Sum of VHAS | 15 | \$189.12 | \$1,232.84 | \$1,197.28 |
| AFH Costs per DU | 15 | \$7,081 | \$7,488 | \$3,098 |
| Civilian Salaries | 10 | \$66,900 | \$58,809 | \$61,913 |
| BASOPS MER Factor | 20 | 0.040 | ? | 0.019 |
| BASOPS CER Factor | 20 | 6955 | ? | 4546 |
| MILCON Cost Factor | 20 | 1.06 | 1.13 | 1.23 |
| OPERATION EFFICIENCY | 100 | 6.5 | 3.0-7.0 | 6.3 |
| EXPANDABILITY ... | | | | |
| Buildable Acres | 50 | 104 | 0 | 200 |
| Encroachment | 20 | 138 | 372 | 108 |
| Environment | 50 | 4.5 | 5.2 | 7.7 |
| Multi-function | 30 | 25 | 15 | 10 |
| Infrastructure | 50 | 6.2 | 5.3 | 2.6 |
| EXPANDABILITY | 200 | 6.3 | 3.7 | 5.3 |
| SCORE | 1000 | 6.5 | 6.1-6.5 | 4.7 |
| RANK | | 1 | 2 | 3 |

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT - PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS

| | WEIGHT | McNair | Carlisle |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|------------|
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY ... | | | |
| Mob Billets (WT) | 30 | 0 | 0 |
| Army Readiness | 50 | 2 | 2 |
| General Instr Fac | 100 | 452,389 | 273,992 |
| Deployment (Trans) | 30 | 8.9 | 8.1 |
| RC/Area Support | 40 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| MISSION ESSENTIALITY | --- 250 | 3.6 | 2.3 |
| MISSION SUITABILITY ... | | | |
| Applied Instr Fac | 70 | 0 | 0 |
| Contiguous Maneuver | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| Ranges | 10 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Maintenance Fac | 20 | 17,762 | 26,742 |
| Operations/Admin | 55 | 180,929 | 65,662 |
| Info Msn Area Spt | 55 | 270 | 415 |
| Construct Invest | 30 | 31 | 38 |
| MISSION SUITABILITY | --- 250 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| QUALITY OF LIFE ... | | | |
| Percent Permanent | 25 | 100.0% | 98.5% |
| ARMY COE Score | 10 | 1 | 3 |
| Family Housing | 30 | 1,525 | 612 |
| Officer UPH | 25 | 31 | 44 |
| UEPH & Trainee | 40 | 177 | 112 |
| Community Fac (SF) | 30 | 117,267 | 194,611 |
| Places Rated Alamc | 15 | 4 | 65 |
| Health Care Spt In | 25 | 1 | 36 |
| QUALITY OF LIFE | --- 200 | 4.0 | 1.7 |
| OPERATION EFFICIENCY ... | | | |
| Sum of VHAS | 15 | \$1,345.32 | \$292.36 |
| AFH Costs per DU | 15 | \$20,787 | \$7,854 |
| Civilian Salaries | 10 | \$61,298 | \$59,979 |
| BASOPS MER Factor | 20 | N/A | 0.119 |
| BASOPS CER Factor | 20 | N/A | 9581 |
| MILCON Cost Factor | 20 | 1.05 | 0.94 |
| OPERATION EFFICIENCY | --- 100 | 1.9-5.9 | 5.5 |
| EXPANDABILITY ... | | | |
| Buildable Acres | 50 | 4 | 25 |
| Encroachment | 20 | 9,633 | 357 |
| Environment | 50 | 8.9 | 9.6 |
| Multi-function | 30 | 25 | 20 |
| Infrastructure | 50 | 4.6 | 2.3 |
| EXPANDABILITY | --- 200 | 5.2 | 4.8 |
| SCORE | 1000 | 3.2-3.6 | 2.7 |
| RANK | | 4 | 5 |

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT - PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS

| | 0 | SCORES | | | | 10 |
|------------------------|---|--------|----|---|----|----|
| 1 Fort Leavenworth | : | . | . | . | X | : |
| 2 West Point | : | . | . | . | XX | : |
| 3 Presidio of Monterey | : | . | . | X | . | : |
| 4 Fort McNair | : | . | XX | . | . | : |
| 5 Carlisle Barracks | : | . | X | . | . | : |

PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS MILITARY VALUE SCORES

Note: This quantitative assessment provides a starting point in the evaluation of the Army's base structure. It does not produce a decision on which base should close or be realigned. Although the assessment offers a logical basis for judging possible opportunities for closure and realignment, it is just one element in the Army's overall evaluation.

3. INSTALLATION SCREENING

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Ranks 5/5. Home of the Army's War College. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Ranks 1/5. Home of the Army's Command and General Staff College. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Fort Leslie McNair, Washington, DC. Ranks 4/5. Home of the National Defense University, which includes the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

Presidio of Monterey, California. Ranks 3/5. Home of the Defense Language Institute. The Commander, TRADOC, through his vision, requested it be reviewed under BRAC 93.

United States Military Academy, New York. Ranks 2/5. West Point is a special one-of-a-kind installation whose purpose is to

provide quality academic, military and physical development of this nation's future military leaders. The main post area is designated as a National Register of Historical Places site. There are no restructuring or reshaping initiatives that affect this installation. Therefore, it was deferred from further study.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION

a. Recommendation

- Close the Presidio of Monterey (POM) and the Presidio of Monterey Annex (part of Fort Ord). Relocate the Defense Language Institute (DLI) and contract the foreign language training with a public university which must be able to provide training at or near Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

b. Justification

(1) Military Value

The Defense Language Institute currently has a staff and student population of over 4000 personnel. This institute offers training in over 20 languages (e.g., Russian, Somali, Swahili, Ukrainian). However, it has a high operating overhead in both facilities and staff. A new approach to the operation of the Institute should be considered.

Contracting foreign language training with an existing university level-institution will create significant savings in operational overhead, both in instructors (many of whom may already be on staff at a university), and in administration. The high base operations cost at the Presidio of Monterey would be avoided.

Fort Huachuca is the home of the Army Intelligence School. Military intelligence has the largest requirement for linguists in all services. The foreign language skill is most often used to interact with allies and better understand foreign military capability and intentions. Locating military personnel on Fort Huachuca provides advantages to both the soldier and the Army. First, it enables the Army to care for the needs of the soldiers during their formative training. It ensures "Soldierization" which is a critical factor in the development of all military personnel. Finally it will enable the Army to integrate the students into the military intelligence concept during their training.

Army students in the human intelligence field are currently assigned to Fort Huachuca at the end of their foreign language training. Soldiers can attend the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) and continue with advanced language

training or attend the Advanced Non Commissioned Officers Course and then continue with intermediate language training. This would save travel and per diem costs.

An agreement of this kind is not unique. For example, the University of Virginia at Charlottesville is the location of the Judge Advocate General School and the University of Syracuse sponsors the Army Comptroller graduate education program.

The Army, as Executive Agent for the Defense Language Program, will ensure that the same high level of training currently taught at DLI will continue. They will continue to serve as the technical authority and provide qualitative assessment of foreign language training activities. In addition they will also conduct research and evaluation on training development methodologies, instructional methodologies and techniques; computer based training computer assisted instruction; and establish or approve standards or criteria for language training and provide various tests and evaluation procedures.

(2) Return on Investment

The Cost of Base Closure and Realignment Actions (COBRA) model used for ranking alternative closure/realignment actions distributes the costs into six major categories. They are Mission, Personnel, Overhead, Construction, Moving and Other. A short explanation and description of each category follows.

Mission: Direct mission costs are not addressed in this exercise. However, those changes in mission costs result from a closure or realignment action are estimated and are captured in this element.

Personnel: This cost category captures all those costs associated with military and civilian pay and allowances (not including closure generated Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves.) Besides savings of service funded salaries due to decrease in authorizations, differentials in variable housing allowance and/or basic allowance for quarters are also included.

Overhead: Changes in Real Property Maintenance, Base Operations Support, and Family Housing maintenance requirements are the primary components of Overhead. Costs associated with the maintenance and caretaking of an installation are also included as are administrative and support costs generated in the accomplishment of a closure or realignment.

Construction: Military construction (MILCON) cost and avoidances are the main components. MILCON includes estimates for design; supervision, inspection, and overhead; contingency; and site preparation. Site preparation includes the supporting

facilities and infrastructure requirements to support the construction.

Moving: Moving contains all freight and per diem costs incurred in the movement of personnel and material. Included are mileage, reimbursement of income tax assessment, house-hunting, home sale/purchase reimbursement, household goods, packing, storage, loss. The military PCS cost is computed for all military authorizations being moved. This amount is reduced by the amount of routine military PCS costs included in the composite military sale factor.

Other: This category contains a disparate compendium of cost elements. Some of these should be included in the previous categories and will be in future versions of COBRA. The costs elements included here are CHAMPUS, cost for new hires, homeowners assistance, unemployment, information management area (associated with MILCON), environmental mitigation, other one-time costs, procurement cost avoidance, and land sales/purchase. Also addressed are additional personnel costs such as reduction-in-force pay, excess annual leave payments, and priority placement PCS costs.

In addition to the above breakout, the Realignment Summary includes information on the 20-year net present value of the option, the total one time costs, the years to break even, the return on investment years.

The primary costs for realignment of the Presidio of Monterey are costs associated with a university providing the training and military and civilian personnel moves. Savings are generated by eliminating base operations at one installation, while another installation's increase is minimal.

Realignment summary for the recommendation is enclosed.

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v4.04)

Group : TRADOC-POM/HUACHUCA
 Service : ARMY
 Option Package : T4-1X8

Starting Year : 1994
 Break Even Year: 2001 (Year 8)
 ROI Year : 2001 (2 Years)

Option NPV in 2013 (\$K) :-235,574
 Total One-Time Cost (\$K) : 155,499

| | Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars | | | | | | |
|--------------|----------------------------------|----------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | Beyond |
| Misn | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pers | 0 | 0 | 0 | -31,746 | -62,590 | -62,590 | -62,590 |
| Ovhd | 47 | 1,297 | 877 | 18,797 | 13,667 | 13,667 | 13,667 |
| Cons | 9,066 | 100,736 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Movg | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7,878 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Othr | 1,550 | 11,643 | 864 | 23,634 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 10,663 | 113,676 | 1,741 | 18,564 | -48,923 | -48,923 | -48,923 |

| | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | TOTAL |
|--|----------|----------|----------|--------------|----------|----------|--------------|
| <u>FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS</u> | | | | | | | |
| Officers | 0 | -11 | -3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -14 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 92 | 29 | -1 | 0 | 0 | 120 |
| Civilian | 0 | -159 | 6 | -79 | 0 | 0 | -232 |
| <u>POSITIONS ELIMINATED</u> | | | | | | | |
| Officers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civilian | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,395 | 0 | 0 | 1,395 |
| <u>PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS</u> | | | | | | | |
| Officers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 73 | 0 | 0 | 73 |
| Enlisted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 314 | 0 | 0 | 314 |
| Students | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,496 | 0 | 0 | 2,496 |
| TOT MIL | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,883 | 0 | 0 | 2,883 |
| Civilian | 0 | 0 | 0 | 229 | 0 | 0 | 229 |
| TOTAL | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3,112 | 0 | 0 | 3,112 |

Summary:

DLI IS CONTRACTED TO A PUBLIC UNIVERSITY NEAR FT HUACHUCA. POM ANNEX AND FORT ORD ARE CLOSED. CONTRACT COSTS ARE \$37M.

(3) Environmental

Environmental impact was considered at both the gaining and losing installations and was not considered a dominant factor except in compliance and restoration areas. There are no major environmental limitations to closure at the Presidio of Monterey. There are also no major impediments to the relocation to Fort Huachuca.

Summary of potential environmental impact are provided below.

(a) Presidio of Monterey, California.

Threatened or Endangered Species: One listed and one candidate species are located on the installation. Closure is not limited, but disposal may be somewhat limited because the presence of these species precludes unconstrained use of the property by new owners.

Wetlands: No wetlands exist on the installation, therefore does not limit disposal.

Historic or Archeological Sites: Limited information is available about the status of historical and archeological surveys. Building inventories and archeological surveys will be needed to identify historical properties. Disposal may require deed covenants or mitigation, and transfer to another service may require agreement to also transfer historic preservation obligations.

Pollution Control: There is sufficient water, wastewater, and solid waste service available. No limitations exist to transfer to another service.

Hazardous Materials/Wastes: Only minor contamination problems have been identified at this installation. There are no limitations to closure/disposal.

Land Use and Airspace Implications: This installation is primarily a cantonment area. There are no wetlands, impact areas, training areas, airspace restrictions, etc. Natural resource and land management plans are due for completion in FY93. No limitations exist to transfer to another service.

Programmed Environmental Costs/Cost Avoidances: Restoration costs for Fort Ord and all sub-installations is \$60M. Restoration costs for POM are not available.

(b) Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Threatened or Endangered Species: One listed species occurs and many candidate species may occur on post which could result in some mission restrictions. Administrative and cantonment training facilities however, should not be a major problem.

Wetlands: 450 acres of wetlands occur on the installation, but there are no problems with the realignment due to these wetlands.

Historic or Archeological Sites: A Historic Preservation Plan is completed. Archaeological survey and historic building inventory work is underway but not fully completed. New construction might require archaeological survey. Renovation of historic buildings needs to follow guidelines in the Historic Preservation Plan.

Pollution Control/Infrastructure: Water supply and solid waste disposal systems have ample capacities to accommodate the realignment. The wastewater treatment will require upgrade to handle additional population.

Hazardous Materials/Wastes: Realignment of the Polygraph School and the Defense Language Institute should have no impact on the status of on-going or programmed environmental activities. However, if existing facilities are to be used for incoming mission, consideration should be given to potential asbestos, radon, or lead-based paint abatements.

Land Use and Airspace Implications: The installation has 73,000+ acres with 4,900 acres cantonment area, 12,000 acre impact area, 450 acres wetlands, and 20,500+ acres restricted use for other considerations. DERA sites, endangered species, cultural resource sites represent other restrictions. A slight noise encroachment issue exists with the airfield and town of Sierra Vista. Expansion capability exists to accommodate the proposed actions. Constraints to construction may be represented by DERA sites and cultural resource sites.

Programmed Environmental Costs/Cost Avoidances: Programmed environmental costs should not be effected by the receipt of these realignments.

(4) Community Infrastructure

The ability of the existing facilities and the potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel is measured in the assessment of military value. The Places Rated Almanac rating is used to assess the overall quality of life in the surrounding community. The Environmental Carrying Capacity attribute addresses the issue of infrastructure for water, sewer, electrical, and landfill capacity at each installation and includes community infrastructure assets when jointly used. The Army Family Housing attribute assesses the number and quality of family quarters available on post and in the community.

The expansion of infrastructure at gaining installations and communities, including roads, water, sewer, and electrical capacity, is funded when necessary in the military construction estimate.

(5) Socioeconomic

The economic impact on communities was considered by the Army for each professional school being realigned, but was not a deciding factor. There will be increases in unemployment in surrounding communities if any installation is closed or has a population decline. The proposed realignment of the Presidio of Monterey has potential for disposal of facilities and land excess to the Army's needs. Summary of the potential socioeconomic impacts are provided below.

The proposed realignment of the Presidio of Monterey may result in the potential loss of 4.2 percent of jobs in the local community.

5. PERSONNEL IMPACTS

PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

| | FY94 BASELINE | FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES | RIFS | MOVES | CARE- TAKERS | END STATE | NET CHANGE |
|------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------|
| OFFICERS | 72 | 1 | 0 | 73 | 0 | 0 | -73 |
| ENLISTED | 314 | 0 | 0 | 314 | 0 | 0 | -314 |
| STUDENTS | 2496 | 0 | 0 | 2496 | 0 | 0 | -2496 |
| TOTAL MIL | 2882 | 1 | 0 | 2883 | 0 | 0 | -2883 |
| CIVILIANS | 1618 | 6 | 1395 | 229 | 0 | 0 | -1624 |
| TOTAL | 4500 | 7 | 1395 | 3112 | 0 | 0 | -4507 |

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS - FROM PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

| | FT HUACHUCA | FT LEAVENWORTH ¹ | BASE X ² |
|------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| OFFICERS | 54 | 1 | 18 |
| ENLISTED | 203 | 0 | 111 |
| STUDENTS | 2496 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL MIL | 2753 | 1 | 129 |
| CIVILIANS | 197 | 32 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 2950 | 33 | 129 |

1. U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences.

2. Organizations/activities on Presidio of Monterey being relocated to destinations not yet determined. Note: Per DoD guidance, the The Army does not normally specify receiving bases for units or activities of less than 100 U.S. Government personnel. BASE X acts as the surrogate receiving base for units or activities relocating to indeterminate destinations.